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A REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE IN FLORIDA: HAS THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SIXTH AMENDMENT BEEN 
RECONCILED? 
Honorable Jay B. Rosman
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The reporter’s privilege in Florida is examined. At the heart of this 
examination is the inherent conflict between two constitutional amendments in the 
Bill of Rights—the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment1—specifically, the 
conflict that exists between the freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial.
2
 
The salient question addressed is whether the conflict between the First 
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment has been reconciled on the issue of a 
reporter’s privilege by Florida courts and the Florida Legislature. The answer to 
that question is addressed throughout the paper and more directly during the 
paper’s conclusion. 
This is both an analytic and empirical study. Analytically, in order to address 
this constitutional conflict, it is important to look at the two amendments, to define 
a reporter’s privilege, and to consider the history of the privilege. After looking at 
the history of the reporter’s privilege, pivotal early Florida Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the reporter’s privilege are discussed. Also, section 90.5015 of the 
Florida Statutes, enacted in October of 1998, and known as the Journalist’s 
Privilege Statute, is examined along with Florida Supreme Court cases and Florida 
District Court of Appeals cases, post-legislatively. In addition, federal cases that 
have interpreted Florida law in this area are discussed. Finally, there is a brief 
discussion of the new media and what affect, if any, it has had on Florida law 
regarding this issue.  
Empirically, a survey was conducted and the results are discussed. The survey 
company was hired to conduct a random phone survey using ten questions to see 
whether the public’s attitudes and perceptions regarding this issue are consistent or 
 ________________________  
 * Judge Jay B. Rosman presently serves as the Chief Judge of Florida’s Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Judge 
Rosman has served as a Circuit Judge since 1992. Prior to the circuit bench, he served as a County Judge for Lee 
County from 1986. Judge Rosman has also served as an Associate Judge for the Second District Court of Appeal 
on three occasions. Judge Rosman received his B.A. with honors from Hofstra University in 1975, his J.D. from 
the University of Akron in 1978, and M.J.S. from the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada in 
1994. He presently is a Doctoral candidate in judicial studies. This article is submitted towards completion of his 
doctorate. Prior to becoming Chief Judge, Judge Rosman taught Business Law and Criminal Law from 1982–2010 
at the University of South Florida in Ft. Myers and at Florida Gulf Coast University in Ft. Myers, Florida. 
 1. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS 68 
(Jennings Bryant et al. eds., 1997). 
 2. DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SINCE 1807 1 
(1994). 
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contrary to the state of the law concerning this issue.
3
 An additional five questions 
were administered inquiring about the gender, race, age, political affiliation, and 
education level of the respondents; the results were tabulated to see if any of those 
factors impacted the results.
4
  
II. THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
A.   First Amendment 
The First Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”5  
B.   Sixth Amendment  
The Sixth Amendment provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.
6
 
III. THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE IN CONTEXT 
A constitutional battle exists today between journalists and participants in the 
criminal justice system.
7
 The participants include judges, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and law enforcement. Central to the battle is the desire of the participants 
to seek evidence from members of the media.
8
 Journalists argue that the First 
Amendment protects them from testifying.
9
 The thrust of the argument is that 
testifying undermines the essence of a free press, which is to keep the public 
informed.
10
 A journalist cannot keep the public informed if one is restricted to a 
 ________________________  
 3. See Telephone Poll with 600 Florida registered voters, Public Policy Polling (2011) [hereinafter Public 
Policy Polling]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 7. See generally MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL: COVERING THE COURTS (1998), reprinted in, COVERING THE 
COURTS: FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIALS AND JOURNALISTIC PERFORMANCE (Robert Giles & Robert Snyder eds., 1999) 
(discussing the conflict that journalists and participants face when balancing free press versus fair trials).   
 8. Id. at 120. 
 9. Id. at 27. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
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courtroom. The public also may not view the press as free and objective if 
journalists continually become witnesses for litigants. 
Moreover, subpoenaing a journalist threatens to transform an independent 
press into an investigative arm of the government, the same government that the 
press was intended to scrutinize in order to maintain a free and open society.
11
 
Also, by forcing journalists to testify, confidential sources may become reluctant to 
speak.
12
 This would result in the reduction of the “free flow of information to the 
public,”13 which would violate the First Amendment.14 Over time, journalists have 
argued that a reporter’s privilege should exist through the First Amendment to act 
as a shield to prevent journalists from testifying about any information gained as 
part of their newsgathering work product.
15
  
However, the criminal justice perspective is viewed from a different 
constitutional prism. That perspective is based on the Sixth Amendment. The 
participants in the justice system look at evidence that will assist or detract from 
the case at hand.
16
 Who holds the salient information does not matter from this 
perspective. The overriding consideration is whether the material probative 
evidence will assist a jury, grand jury, or judge in their pursuit.
17
  
Furthermore, safeguarding the First Amendment is not a priority, if even a 
consideration at all, in seeking to admit evidence before a judge or jury.
18
 
However, establishing probable cause or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
prime importance.
19
 Whether or not a case is proven is the focal point of the 
participants in the trial setting.
20
 Ensuring that criminal defendants obtain a fair 
trial is paramount.
21
 Prosecutors seek to introduce evidence that will assist them in 
meeting their high burden to obtain a conviction.
22
 From this perspective, reporters 
are simply another class of individuals who have gained possession of material 
evidence in a case, who, like any other citizen of this country, have a duty and an 
obligation to testify.
23
 
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE  
In the United States, the roots of the reporter’s privilege can be traced back to 
1848.
24
 The situation involved Congress and a reporter, not the justice system.
25
 A 
 ________________________  
 11. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 731. 
 13. Id. at 725. 
 14. Id. at 725–26. 
 15. MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL, supra note 7, at 7. 
 16. Myriad Media, The Criminal Justice System, NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,  
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/the-criminal-justice-
system (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 736–38 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 19. Id. at 686–87 (majority opinion).   
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 685. 
 22. Id. at 739–40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
 23. Id. at 685 (majority opinion). 
 24. STEPHEN BATES, THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE, THEN AND NOW 2 (2000). 
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journalist from the New York Herald, John Nugent, refused to testify before 
Congress.
26
 Congress wanted Nugent to reveal who gave him a copy of a proposed 
secret treaty with Mexico.
27
 (Evidently, “leaks” are not a recent phenomenon.). 
When Nugent refused to testify, Congress found him in contempt and sentenced 
Nugent to jail:
28
 a punishment against journalists that continues to this day.
29
 
Nugent relied on the reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment when refusing to 
testify.
30
 However, Congress recognized no such privilege.
31
 When Nugent 
attempted to have the federal court intercede, the judge deferred to Congress and 
found no basis to intervene.
32
 Arguably, the federal court did not recognize a 
reporter’s privilege at that time. The Senate released Nugent after it became 
apparent that he was not going to testify.
33
 
In the 1800s, American treatises recognized certain privileges from the 
common law, specifically, the attorney-client privilege and the husband-wife 
privilege.
34
 Interestingly, at that time the doctor-patient privilege and the clergy-
penitent privilege had not gained academic acceptance.
35
 Later in time, the courts 
began to accept the doctor-patient privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege.
36
 
This gave hope to journalists that their claim to a reporter’s privilege would 
ultimately be recognized.
37
 
Throughout the early 1900s, journalists refused to testify.
38
 The refusal was 
based on the belief that testifying would have a “chilling effect” on their sources of 
news.
39
 Journalists argued that without such sources, newspapers would no longer 
exist.
40
 One argument made by a reporter was that by breaching the promise of 
confidentiality, the reporter could lose an important property right—his job.41 
However, courts continually refused to recognize the existence of any reporter’s 
privilege under the First Amendment.
42
 The courts’ position was that reporters 
  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, 
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/jailed-journalists (last visited 
November 18, 2013) (illustrating that journalists are still being found in contempt and sentenced to jail when 
refusing to testify in recent cases).  
 30. See Daniel Scardino, Vanessa Leggett Serves Maximum Jail Time, First Amendment-Based Reporter’s 
Privilege Under Seige, FINDLAW (March 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/vanessa-
leggett-serves-maximum-jail-time-first-amendment-based.html.  
 31. Id.  
 32. BATES, supra note 24, at 2.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. BATES, supra note 24, at 2. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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were citizens, no different from any other citizen who had relevant information 
concerning the particular proceeding at hand.
43
 
Initially, legislatures were not any more sympathetic to journalists than the 
courts.
44
 While the earliest shield law was passed in Maryland in 1896,
45
 it was not 
until the 1930s and the 1940s that additional states passed shield legislation.
46
  
A.   Garland v. Torre 
In fact, the first time a First Amendment privilege case reached a federal 
appeals court was in 1958, in the case of Garland v. Torre.
47
 The Garland case 
involved the famous entertainer Judy Garland.
48
 In 1957, CBS and Garland were 
trying to schedule television specials together.
49
 However, they were unable to 
agree on the times and format for the programs.
50
 Marie Torre, a columnist for the 
New York Herald Tribune, quoted an unnamed source from CBS who told Torre 
that Garland was unable to come to terms with CBS because she was troubled.
51
 
The source believed that Garland was troubled because Garland, herself, believed 
that she was “terribly fat.”52  
Garland was offended by the remarks printed in the newspaper and sued CBS 
for libel and breach of contract in the amount of 1.4 million dollars.
53
 When 
questioned by Garland’s lawyers, Torre refused to reveal the source of her 
information.
54
 Torre argued that no one would talk to her again if she revealed the 
confidential source.
55
 Torre’s attorney, retained by the New York Herald Tribune, 
argued that the First Amendment created a reporter-source privilege that shielded 
Torre from disclosing the source of her information.
56
  
The federal appellate court declined to recognize the reporter’s privilege, even 
though the court noted the importance of a vibrant First Amendment and its role in 
a free society.
57
 However, the ruling clearly stated that the freedom contained 
within the First Amendment was not absolute.
58
 More importantly, the court noted 
that a person’s First Amendment right is almost always impinged upon when a 
person is asked to testify.
59
 Moreover, the court found no specific protection to 
 ________________________  
 43. Id.  
 44. BATES, supra note 24, at 2. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).  
 48. BATES, supra note 24, at 2. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. BATES, supra note 24, at 3. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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refuse to testify in a court setting within the strict construction of the Constitution 
based upon the grounds asserted.
60
  
Ultimately, between the two constitutional provisions, the court continued the 
tradition of recognizing the need for testimony in a Sixth Amendment setting of a 
trial, irrespective of the source of the information.
61
 In the First Amendment 
context, the court found no specific guarantee of a reporter’s privilege in the plain 
language of the Constitution, and that a reporter had to testify just like any other 
citizen.
62
  
In the Garland case, Torre was incarcerated for ten days for refusing to 
testify.
63
 However, she received a great deal of publicity and journalistic support 
for her decision not to testify.
64
 Torre proclaimed that she did not regret her 
decision not to testify; in fact, she thought it may have been her greatest 
opportunity in advancing her career.
65
 In the end, the court neither gained the 
testimony it sought from the reporter, nor did the contemnor express any remorse 
for her decision.
66
 
B. Landmark Decision: Branzburg v. Hayes  
In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the government that sought information from 
reporters.
67
 Prosecutors issued subpoenas to force journalists to disclose 
confidential sources before grand juries.
68
 Notably, three such journalists refused to 
testify.
69
 One was Earl Caldwell of the New York Times, who began covering the 
Black Panther Organization and compiled notes and tape-recorded conversations of 
various members.
70
 After an article appeared in the New York Times, the FBI 
became interested in the information that Caldwell had gathered.
71
 Caldwell 
refused to comply with the production of any of his work product and claimed a 
reporter’s privilege in refusing to testify before a federal grand jury.72  
Another journalist and television reporter, Paul Pappas, was also covering the 
Black Panther movement.
73
 His coverage in New Bedford, Massachusetts, also 
drew the interest of law enforcement.
74
 When issued a subpoena to testify 
concerning what he observed at the Black Panther’s headquarters, Pappas refused 
to testify before a state grand jury.
75
  
 ________________________  
 60. BATES, supra note 24, at 3. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See BATES, supra note 24, at 3.  
 67. See id. at 4. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 5. 
 70. Id. at 3. 
 71. Id. at 4.  
 72. BATES, supra note 24, at 5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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The third journalist, Paul Branzburg, was a reporter with the Louisville 
Courier-Journal.
76
 Unlike the other two journalists, Branzburg was not covering 
the Black Panther movement.
77
 Branzburg’s investigation focused on drug dealers 
and drug users.
78
 His articles were based upon his observations and information 
from confidential sources.
79
 After being subpoenaed by the state grand jury, 
Branzburg refused to testify and also refused to reveal his confidential sources.
80
 
As with the other two reporters, Branzburg asserted a First Amendment reporter’s 
privilege not to testify.
81
 
All three cases, which involved grand jury subpoenas of reporters, were 
merged into the landmark First Amendment case, Branzburg v. Hayes, which was 
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1972.
82
 In a five-to-four decision, 
Justice White wrote the majority opinion.
83
 The majority succinctly addressed and 
responded to the issue before it as follows: 
Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses 
that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to 
create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant 
newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. 
This we decline to do.
84
  
The United States Supreme Court rejected the existence of a reporter’s 
privilege.
85
 While the majority gave initial recognition to the importance of the 
First Amendment, Justice White’s opinion did not believe that the courts were 
impinging on any rights by requiring grand jury testimony of a reporter.
86
 Justice 
White maintained “these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no 
prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or 
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold.”87  
Furthermore, the majority found no impact on the First Amendment in 
requiring journalists to testify and no “chilling effect” on the gathering or 
publishing of information necessary for a free press.
88
 Nor did the Court find that 
revealing confidential sources had a negative effect on newsgathering if journalists 
were forced to disclose their confidential sources.
89
  
 ________________________  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. BATES, supra note 24, at 5. 
 79. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–68 (1972). 
 80. Id. at 668. 
 81. Id. at 679–80. 
 82. BATES, supra note 24, at 5. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689–90.  
 85. Id. at 709. 
 86. See id. at 682–83.   
 87. Id. at 681.   
 88. BATES, supra note 24, at 5. 
 89. Id.  
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The Branzburg majority noted the historical importance of the grand jury and 
the need for information to be given to that body.
90
 In reviewing the common law, 
the Court found no precedent for a reporter’s privilege.91 Moreover, the Court 
found no specific mention of a constitutional privilege affording a reporter a right 
not to testify in the First Amendment or the Bill of Rights.
92
 The Court, as earlier 
stated, only recognized the specific federal privilege not to testify that is set out in 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
93
  
The Court also looked at the First Amendment and the criminal justice system, 
specifically noting that First Amendment rights were required to give way to grand 
jury proceedings and criminal trials.
94
 The Court looked at the role of a reporter 
and a common citizen, and did not distinguish the two.
95
 In the Court’s eyes, both 
had the duty to testify before a grand jury and in a criminal trial.
96
 
Interestingly, the majority wrote that state legislatures were free to consider the 
issue of a reporter’s privilege and had the power to address the issue differently, in 
light of their respective state constitutions.
97
 The only protection for journalists that 
the majority recognized was from a bad faith grand jury investigation.
98
 The Court 
warned that harassment of a reporter without any good faith basis would find 
protection under the First Amendment.
99
  
An important facet of the Branzburg decision was the concurring opinion 
written by Justice Powell.
100
 Justice Powell agreed with the majority that reporters 
were not without some constitutional protection.
101
 While not specifically 
recognizing a privilege, Justice Powell noted that the Court was sympathetic to the 
First Amendment and would not allow the media to become an arm of the 
government.
102
 He also stated that journalists should be free from harassment.
103
 
Not only was the reporter protected from a bad faith investigation, but according to 
Justice Powell, the reporter would be protected from an investigation that sought 
information that was remote and tenuous.
104
 If a journalist asserted such 
harassment, Justice Powell suggested that a motion to quash the subpoena should 
be brought.
105
 Furthermore, Justice Powell maintained that such an assertion should 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, by use of the balancing test approach.
106
 
Justice Powell surmised that a judge must consider the balance between freedom of 
 ________________________  
 90. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 689–90.   
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 691.  
 95. Id. at 697.  
 96. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 697. 
 97. Id. at 706. 
 98. Id. at 707. 
 99. Id. at 707–08. 
 100. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 709–10. 
 104. Id. at 710. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
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the press and the duty of a citizen to provide testimony about criminal conduct.
107
 
In short, Justice Powell stated that the courts were “available” to journalists if there 
is a First Amendment violation.
108
 He was unable, however, to take the next step 
and recognize a constitutional privilege for reporters based in the First 
Amendment.  
In the eight months following Branzburg, thirty-five reporters were called to 
testify and refused.
109
 They were found in contempt of court and dozens of 
journalists were jailed as a result.
110
 Journalists continued to seek relief at the state 
and federal level.
111
 At the time of the Branzburg decision, seventeen states had 
shield laws.
112
 Today, a review of state statutes revealed that thirty-one states and 
the District of Columbia
113
 have shield laws. Hawaii repealed their reporter’s 
privilege statute on June 30, 2013.
114
  
After Branzburg, media lawyers argued to lower courts that Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion together with the dissenting four Justices created a qualified 
reporter’s privilege, even though the majority opinion rejected a qualified 
reporter’s privilege.115 Courts at the state and federal level in both civil and 
criminal cases accepted the proposition that a qualified reporter’s privilege 
existed.
116
 Many of the courts that acknowledged the existence of a qualified 
reporter’s privilege applied a three-prong test.117 The test required the following: 
(1) relevant evidence; (2) a compelling need for information that the witness 
possesses; and (3) no alternative means of obtaining the information.
118
 Unless the 
test was satisfied, courts post-Branzburg were quashing subpoenas issued to 
journalists.
119
 This three-prong test was the test enunciated by the Branzburg 
dissent and rejected by the majority.
120
  
The United States Supreme Court has not receded from the Branzburg majority 
opinion. However, it is interesting to note that approximately forty years since its 
decision, the Court has declined to hear another case involving the reporter’s 
privilege, even when lower courts have recognized a privilege and applied the 
three-prong test before requiring a journalist to testify.
121
 As to how the Supreme 
Court would rule if presented with a reporter’s privilege issue again remains an 
open academic question. 
 ________________________  
 107. Id.  
 108. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 109. BATES, supra note 24, at 6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. H.R. 622, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013).  
 115. BATES, supra note 24, at 7. 
 116. Id. at 8. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. BATES, supra note 24, at 7. 
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V.  EARLIEST FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASES 
A.   Morgan v. State 
The origin of the reporter’s privilege in Florida can be traced back to a 1976 
case involving a reporter named Lucy Morgan, in which the Florida Supreme Court 
recognized a reporter’s limited or conditional First Amendment privilege.122 The 
court’s analysis was based on the Justices’ interpretation of the Branzburg 
decision.
123
   
Morgan, a reporter for the Pasco Times, a Florida newspaper, was covering a 
story about public officials being investigated for corruption in Dade City.
124
 
County and city officials were being investigated by a grand jury.
125
 On November 
1, 1973, Morgan, utilizing a confidential source, wrote an article that summarized 
the grand jury’s sealed presentment. Morgan stated that the presentment was 
critical of various public officials and agencies.
126
   
The state attorney, who presented the corruption case to the grand jury, was 
displeased with the article written by Morgan.
127
 The prosecutor sought to find out 
the source of the information by questioning Morgan.
128
 She refused to disclose the 
confidential source to the state attorney.
129
 Within twelve hours of publication of 
the article, Morgan was convicted of contempt and sentenced to serve five months 
in jail.
130
  
Before the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the first conviction, 
Morgan was convicted a second time for contempt when a grand jury was 
convened to address the issue of her disclosing a secret presentment.
131
 When 
asked to reveal the source of her information concerning the presentment, Morgan 
again refused to answer.
132
 She was then sentenced to serve a ninety-day 
sentence.
133
 The appellate court affirmed the second conviction and sentence.
134
 
The court distinguished the two convictions by finding that the first contempt 
proceeding was brought improperly by the prosecutor on his own behalf, while the 
second contempt proceeding was properly brought before a grand jury.
135
  
Previous to the Morgan case, in 1950, the Florida Supreme Court had rejected 
the contention that reporters had any privilege to refuse to disclose confidential 
sources.
136
 That was the last time the Florida Supreme Court addressed the 
 ________________________  
 122. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976). 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. at 952. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 952. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 953 (citing Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 134. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 952–53 (citing Morgan, 325 So. 2d at 41). 
 135. Id. at 953. 
 136. Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950). 
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existence of a reporter’s privilege. Branzburg, however, had been decided by the 
United States Supreme Court only four years before the Morgan decision. 
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court was mindful of the Branzburg case and 
analyzed the Morgan case according to the standards set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court wrestled with determining which 
standard should be imposed when addressing the existence of a reporter’s 
privilege.
137
  
Justice Hatchett wrote the majority opinion.
138
 Noting initially the importance 
of Branzburg, the court stated, “The United States Supreme Court has now 
sanctioned the view that the First Amendment affords ‘some protection for seeking 
out the news.’”139 The court also distinguished the majority opinion, as well as the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Branzburg.
140
 Justice White’s majority 
opinion was acknowledged; however, it was noted that the majority did not find a 
privilege for journalists to refuse to testify about crimes they had witnessed.
141
 The 
only protection the Branzburg majority granted was the protection from bad faith 
investigations of crime.
142
  
The Florida Supreme Court pointed out that Morgan was factually 
distinguishable from Branzburg.
143
 Morgan had not witnessed a crime; she reported 
the general criticism of a presentment from a grand jury that was investigating 
public officials.
144
 The reporters in Branzburg observed crimes that became the 
subject of their reporting.
145
 After making this factual distinction, the Morgan court 
turned its analysis to Justice Powell’s concurring opinion and his balancing test.146 
The court then took an important analytical step that had been taken by other courts 
post-Branzburg and recognized a privilege by combining Justice Powell’s 
concurrence with the four dissenting Justices.
147
 “Although the plurality opinion 
rejected even a qualified reportorial privilege in terms, Mr. Justice Powell agreed 
with the dissenting justices that a reportorial privilege should be recognized in 
some circumstances. . . . The Branzburg dissenting and concurring opinions 
recognize news gathering as an essential precondition to dissemination of [the] 
news . . . .”148 
In taking this important step in recognizing a privilege, the Florida Supreme 
Court then applied Justice Powell’s balancing test to determine if Morgan was 
privileged to refuse to disclose her confidential source.
149
 The test that was applied 
weighed the freedom of the press versus the obligation of citizens to testify with 
 ________________________  
 137. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 953. 
 138. Id. at 951. 
 139. Id. at 953 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
 140. Id. at 954. 
 141. Id. (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 953 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701). 
 146. Id. at 954 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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relevant evidence.
150
 The only interest the government sought to advance in 
Morgan was the “preservation of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.”151 In this 
case, the court failed to find a legitimate governmental interest that outweighed 
First Amendment rights.
152
 
We cannot accept the view that a generalized interest in secrecy of 
governmental operations should take precedence over the interest 
in assuring public access to information that comes to the press 
from confidential informants. . . . The “preservation of the rule of 
secrecy” in which some government activity has traditionally been 
enshrouded, is not the specific, substantial governmental interest 
necessary to defeat a reportorial source privilege.
153
 
In closing, the Morgan court returned to the Branzburg majority opinion and 
noted that the prosecutor in Morgan had brought contempt proceedings against the 
reporter solely to force her to disclose a confidential source.
154
 The state attorney 
was not interested in seeking evidence concerning an independent crime that the 
journalist had observed.
155
 Nor was the prosecutor seeking testimony that was 
necessary to obtain an indictment or a conviction.
156
 The prosecution was solely 
based on the goal of forcing the disclosure of the grand juror who was “leaking” 
information to a reporter.
157
 In conclusion, the Morgan court found that the 
government could not even meet the standard set out by the Branzburg majority, in 
that the prosecution could not even show that they were proceeding with a good 
faith grand jury investigation.
158
 The court indirectly scolded the government’s 
prosecution of Morgan by stating, “The present case falls squarely within this 
language in the Branzburg plurality opinion: ‘Official harassment of the press 
undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s 
relationship with his news sources would have no justification.’”159 
The analysis of the Branzburg majority was a response to the sole dissent in 
Morgan. The Morgan majority, while adopting Justice Powell’s balancing test, as 
well as the position that Justice Powell’s concurrence combined with the minority, 
created a reporter’s privilege, and addressed the Branzburg plurality decision head 
on.
160
 The Morgan majority pointed out to the Morgan dissent that the state 
government could not even satisfy the bad faith Branzburg standard.
161
  
 ________________________  
 150. Id. at 955. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 956. 
 155. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 956. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972)). 
 160. Id. at 954. 
 161. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.  
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There was a concurring opinion in Morgan written by Justice Sundberg.
162
 
Justice Sundberg generally agreed with the majority and construed the opinion to 
mean that the court had embraced a limited or conditional reporter’s privilege.163 In 
a footnote, Justice Sundberg interpreted Branzburg as providing a privilege 
through Justice Powell’s concurring opinion combined with the four dissenting 
Justices.
164
 While Justice Sundberg expressed his approval of the balancing test as 
set forth in Branzburg, which was adopted in Morgan, he also expressed approval 
of the three-prong test as set forth in the Branzburg dissent.
165
  
Returning to the facts of the Morgan case, Justice Sundberg maintained that 
Morgan was convicted of a crime with evidence that was not supported by the 
record.
166
 The thrust of his position was that the statute that was alleged to have 
been violated proscribed grand jurors from disclosing their deliberations or their 
vote.
167
 This was not the case with Morgan. Morgan did not violate the statute, 
according to the concurrence, because she was not a grand juror.
168
 The statute 
speaks to the person “leaking” information, not to the person who reports or 
publishes the information.
169
  
The sole dissent was from Justice Overton.
170
 He expressed concern that the 
Morgan ruling promoted the disclosure of secret information from a grand jury.
171
 
Justice Overton maintained that the majority decision would allow grand jurors, 
prosecutors, and court reporters the ability to “leak” (a term he used) information 
with immunity.
172
 Such a consequence would diminish the integrity of the grand 
jury, according to Justice Overton.
173
 While expressing support for Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Branzburg, Justice Overton very briefly distinguished Justice Powell’s 
concurrence by stating that the facts in Morgan were not the same as in the case at 
bar.
174
 
While Justice Overton’s dissent expresses a meritorious concern, it is a tenuous 
position. It assumes that the person illegally leaking information will never be 
discovered other than by forcing journalists to disclose their sources. As with any 
criminal investigation, law enforcement is capable of discovering who committed a 
criminal act without solely relying on reporters to prove its case. Punishing the 
“leaker” would prevent the disclosure of secret grand jury evidence, as opposed to 
punishing the journalist for publishing information to the public under the First 
Amendment.
175
 
 ________________________  
 162. Id. at 956 (Sundberg, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 957 (citing Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958–59. 
 174. Id. at 959. 
 175. Id. at 958–59. 
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Morgan is an important case in Florida. It was the first Florida Supreme Court 
case to recognize any reporter’s privilege up to that point.176 It was also the first 
Florida Supreme Court case to analyze the Branzburg decision from the United 
States Supreme Court. The Morgan court found merit in Justice Powell’s 
concurrence and adopted a balancing test when confronted with the issue of 
applying the reporter’s privilege to a journalist who refused to disclose a 
confidential source.
177
 Florida followed the trend that was occurring throughout the 
country—to find a reporter’s privilege in the Branzburg concurring opinion 
combined with its dissent.
178
 
B.   Tribute Company v. Huffstetler  
In 1986, ten years after deciding the Morgan case, the Florida Supreme Court 
was again faced with the issue of a reporter’s privilege arising out of a journalist 
being jailed for contempt.
179
 The case involved a reporter for the Tampa Tribune 
named James Tunstall.
180
 Tunstall co-authored an article in the newspaper stating 
that “an influential resident of West Hernando County” had filed an ethics 
complaint with the Ethics Commission, which charged two local county 
commissioners for misusing their public offices.
181
 The Commission received the 
complaint after the newspaper article had been published.
182
 The Ethics 
Commission dismissed the complaint after finding that the charges were legally 
insufficient.
183
 
After the ethics complaint was dismissed, the two county commissioners 
named in the ethics complaint filed a complaint with the state attorney’s office 
alleging violation of a Florida statute that prohibited disclosure of either an 
intended or existing ethics complaint.
184
 The state attorney’s office conducted an 
investigation.
185
 As part of the investigation, an assistant state attorney subpoenaed 
Tunstall to question him as to the source of his article.
186
 Tunstall’s attorney moved 
to quash the subpoena based on the First Amendment.
187
 The circuit court denied 
the motion to quash.
188
 When asked to reveal his confidential source, Tunstall 
refused.
189
 Judge Huffstetler, the named defendant in the case, found the journalist 
to be in contempt of court for refusing to reveal the confidential source.
190
 The 
 ________________________  
 176. Id. at 955. 
 177. Id. at 954 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 463 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 723. 
 185. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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court sentenced Tunstall to serve six months in jail.
191
 The contempt would have 
been purged if the reporter agreed to testify.
192
 An appeal followed that ultimately 
reached the Florida Supreme Court in the case of Tribune Company v. 
Huffstetler.
193
  
In the analysis in Huffstetler, Justice McDonald, writing for the majority, 
initially referred to the court’s ruling in Morgan and reaffirmed its position.194 The 
court stated, “We begin our analysis of Tunstall’s privilege claim by noting that we 
have previously recognized a qualified reporter’s privilege against the forced 
revelation of sources.”195 After reciting the facts of Morgan, the majority then 
turned to the Branzburg case.
196
 The court noted that the Morgan case was based 
on the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Branzburg.197 More importantly, 
the court expressed its approval of the Powell concurrence and acknowledged that 
the Florida Supreme Court “embraced” Justice Powell’s concurrence in Morgan.198 
By devoting attention to Morgan and its Branzburg foundation, the Florida 
Supreme Court was reaffirming its stance on the existence of a reporter’s privilege, 
as well as a balancing test to determine the extent of the privilege.
199
 
The court, in reaffirming the Morgan analysis and balancing test, found the 
facts of the Huffstetler case to be analogous.
200
 The majority utilized the balancing 
test and found that there was a private interest in protecting one’s reputation when 
looking at the Florida law prohibiting the disclosure of ethics complaints.
201
 The 
court further ruled that this private interest did not outweigh a reporter’s First 
Amendment right.
202
 The freedom of the press prevailed when balanced against a 
limited private interest. Tunstall also attacked his conviction by arguing that the 
applicable Florida statute dealing with the disclosure of ethics complaints was 
unconstitutional.
203
 The majority found no merit in this argument because Tunstall 
had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
204
 The court ruled 
that only a person who is charged criminally under a statute has the ability to 
challenge its constitutional sufficiency.
205
 
One brief concurring opinion was written by Justice Overton, the sole dissenter 
in Morgan.
206
 Justice Overton noted that he dissented in Morgan, but found that, 
under the facts of the Huffstetler case, he agreed with the majority that the 
 ________________________  
 191. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 722–23. 
 195. Id. at 723. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 724. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 724. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 725 (Overton, J., concurring). 
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reporter’s privilege should prevail.207 He noted his approval of Justice Powell’s 
balancing test, as well as the Florida Supreme Court’s application of the balancing 
test in Huffstetler.
208
 
The case contained one dissent written by Chief Justice Boyd, who was joined 
by Justice Shaw.
209
 The dissent began by acknowledging that many United States 
courts of appeals and many Florida appellate courts have been recognizing a 
reporter’s privilege to refuse to disclose information, as well as the identity of 
confidential sources in civil and criminal proceedings.
210
 From there, the dissent 
departed from the majority by arguing that there was no authority at the state or 
federal constitutional level that protected a reporter from refusing to provide 
information concerning a crime committed in the journalist’s presence.211 
In essence, Chief Justice Boyd distinguished “between a reporter’s receiving 
information from a confidential source about the commission of a crime and the 
reporter himself witnessing the commission of a crime.”212 According to the 
dissent, in the former scenario, the journalist may or may not be protected by a 
privilege.
213
 A balancing test would determine the application of the privilege.
214
 In 
the latter scenario, the dissent rejected any privilege.
215
 Chief Justice Boyd 
maintained that the reporter who personally observed a crime should be treated no 
differently, in that he or she has the same duty to testify as any other citizen who 
witnessed a crime.
216
  
The thrust of the Huffstetler dissent was rooted in the Branzburg majority 
opinion. Branzburg and the Huffstetler dissent afforded journalists no privilege 
when witnessing the commission of a crime.
217
 Because Tunstall became a witness 
to a criminal violation of a Florida law dealing with disclosure of ethics 
complaints, Tunstall would have a duty to testify and, in turn, reveal the 
confidential source.
218
 The dissent also, for argument’s sake, maintained that even 
under Justice Powell’s balancing test the result would be the same.219 According to 
Chief Justice Boyd, the interest in enforcing a criminal statute outweighed a 
reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment freedom of the press.220 
The Huffstetler case had significance for several reasons. It clearly reaffirmed 
the principles of Morgan in recognizing a reporter’s privilege.221 The majority in 
Huffstetler spoke in terms of a “qualified” privilege222 compared to the language in 
 ________________________  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725 (Boyd, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 725. 
 221. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 722–23. 
 222. Id. at 723. 
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Morgan of a “limited” or “conditional” privilege.223 The majority even gained the 
acceptance of a reporter’s privilege from Justice Overton, who ten years previously 
in Morgan, had written the sole dissent.
224
 
Huffstetler reaffirmed the existence of a reporter’s privilege and raised the 
argument that the court should expand the privilege.
225
 While the Morgan court 
analyzed its decision under both Justice Powell’s concurrence and the majority 
opinion in Branzburg, the Huffstetler court embraced Justice Powell’s opinion as 
the basis for its decision.
226
 Furthermore, the Morgan case represented the 
protection of a journalist’s confidential sources in a criminal setting, while 
Huffstetler expanded the protection of confidential sources to include civil cases.
227
  
C.   Miami Herald v. Morejon 
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court was asked again to expand the qualified 
reporter’s privilege.228 However, the court declined to expand the privilege any 
further than it had under Morgan and Huffstetler.
229
 The Morejon court decided the 
case without a single dissenting justice. While deciding the issue presented before 
it, the Morejon case also raised many questions.
230
 Unlike the Morgan and 
Huffstetler cases that preceded it, the Morejon case did not involve a journalist who 
had been jailed for refusing to reveal a confidential source.
231
 Also, unlike the cases 
before it, Morejon did not involve a situation where prosecutors sought the 
disclosure of a confidential source.
232
 In Morejon, a defense attorney sought 
exculpatory testimony from a journalist who witnessed his client’s arrest.233 
The reporter involved in the Morejon case was Miami Herald writer, Joel 
Achenbach, who was working on a story for the paper’s Sunday magazine 
section—the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine.234 Achenbach had obtained 
permission from the Metro-Dade police to follow officers who were on duty at the 
Miami International Airport.
235
 While on routine patrol, three police officers 
conducted a consensual search of Morejon and his traveling companion at a public 
 ________________________  
 223. Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 956 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., concurring). 
 224. See Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958–59 (Justice Overton was Chief Justice of 
the Florida Supreme Court when the Morgan case was decided. He was unable to get another justice to join with 
him in the Morgan dissent.). 
 225. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 722–23, 725 (Boyd, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 723; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. 
 227. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723. 
 228. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990). 
 229. Id. at 578. 
 230. Id. at 577–78. 
 231. Id. at 581. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 578. 
 234. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578. 
 235. Id. 
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concourse at the airport.
236
 The search revealed four kilos of cocaine.
237
 After the 
search, Morejon and his companion were both arrested.
238
 
Achenbach witnessed the entire event in his newsgathering capacity.
239
 As the 
events transpired, he was five to six feet away and was taking notes about the 
search and arrest.
240
 He later wrote and published an article discussing the airport 
search and arrest.
241
 In writing the article, Achenbach did not rely on any 
confidential sources.
242
 Morejon’s attorney argued that some details of the article 
were inconsistent with the officer’s account of the arrest.243 
Morejon was formally charged with a crime—trafficking cocaine.244 He pled 
not guilty.
245
 His attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence.
246
 The basis for 
the motion was the allegation that the search was not consensual because Morejon 
claimed he was not sufficiently fluent in English to understand his right to refuse to 
be searched.
247
 His attorney also filed a demand, pursuant to Florida law, for 
discovery seeking the names of witnesses who had any relevant information about 
the offense that was charged.
248
 The state attorney responded to the discovery 
demand and listed the reporter, Achenbach, as an individual who had information 
about the case.
249
 Morejon issued a subpoena requiring Achenbach to appear at a 
deposition and to produce documents.
250
 
Achenbach and the Miami Herald filed a motion to quash the subpoena 
claiming a qualified privilege not to testify under the First Amendment.
251
 The trial 
court denied the motion to quash.
252
 The court ordered Achenbach to submit to a 
deposition and held that no qualified privilege existed for any observations 
Achenbach made during the course of the search and arrest of the defendant, 
Morejon.
253
 The court also found that even if a privilege existed, it would not 
outweigh the need for the reporter to testify as to relevant evidence.
254
 
The Miami Herald sought a writ of certiorari seeking review of the case by the 
appellate court.
255
 That court refused to issue a writ.
256
 The Third District Court of 
Appeal held that the reporter’s qualified privilege “has utterly no application to 
 ________________________  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
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information learned by a journalist as a result of being an eyewitness to a relevant 
event in a subsequent proceeding,” which included the events that transpired in the 
search and arrest of Morejon.
257
 The appellate court allowed for further review of 
the issue by certifying the question of the reporter’s privilege under the facts of the 
case to the Florida Supreme Court.
258
  
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis of the Morejon case by first 
addressing the Branzburg case.
259
 Justice McDonald wrote the majority opinion, as 
he had in Huffstetler.
260
 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Branzburg 
majority opinion and Justice Powell’s concurrence.261 Unlike the Morgan and 
Huffstetler cases before it, the Morejon court italicized Justice Powell’s balancing 
test for further emphasis.
262
  
The Morejon majority explained that it decided two cases post-Branzburg.
263
 
Importantly, in the first footnote, the majority explained its posture in those two 
cases by referencing the concluding remarks of the Branzburg majority opinion.
264
 
In those concluding remarks, the Branzburg majority invited and encouraged state 
legislatures and state courts to address the reporter’s privilege as they deemed 
appropriate.
265
 The Florida Supreme Court also noted that the Florida Legislature 
had declined to adopt a statutory reporter’s privilege or shield law.266 
Notwithstanding, the court explained that any reporter’s privilege would be based 
on the court’s analysis of protections under the United States Constitution and the 
Florida Constitution.
267
 This was an acceptance by the Florida Supreme Court of 
the Branzburg majority’s invitation for states to consider the reporter’s privilege 
based on state law.
268
  
It is interesting to note that the court in Morejon, for the first time, explained 
why the court had adopted Justice Powell’s concurrence rather than following the 
strict posture of the Branzburg majority, which the court failed to explain fourteen 
years earlier in Morgan or four years earlier in Huffstetler.
269
 Those courts simply 
followed Justice Powell’s concurrence without any rationale for discarding the 
Branzburg majority.
270
 The Court’s explanation was expressed in the first footnote 
of the Morejon case.
271
  
 ________________________  
 257. Id. at 578 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 529 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988)). 
 258. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 577; Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986).  
 261. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 579 n.1. 
 265. Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972)). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 702); BUNKER, supra note 1, at 68. 
 268. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 n.1 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706). 
 269. Id. at 579–80. 
 270. Id. at 579. 
 271. Id. at 579 n.1. 
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After explaining the court’s alignment with Justice Powell’s concurrence, the 
court went through its own analysis in Morgan.
272
 The court stated it had taken 
Justice Powell’s balancing test and applied it in Morgan to recognize, for the first 
time, a limited or qualified privilege preventing the disclosure of confidential 
sources.
273
 The court then explained what it did in Huffstetler, noting that it had 
applied the same balancing test as it had in Morgan, and ruled in favor of a 
qualified reporter’s privilege that protected the reporter from revealing confidential 
information.
274
 
In returning to the case at hand, the Morejon court postulated that the first step 
in determining whether a reporter must testify at a deposition was based upon a 
determination of whether any privilege existed to preclude a reporter from 
testifying under the facts of a particular case.
275
 A court will not apply a balancing 
test unless and until there is a finding that a privilege exists.
276
  
The Miami Herald argued that there should be a broad qualified privilege 
whenever a journalist was acting in a newsgathering capacity.
277
 The paper sought 
for the Florida Supreme Court to recognize and expand the reporter’s privilege to 
not only confidential sources, but also to anything a reporter observed or 
gathered.
278
 The newspaper also encouraged the court to adopt a three-prong test, 
instead of Justice Powell’s balancing test.279 Four out of the five state appellate 
courts utilized the three-prong test, which was first enunciated in Garland
280
 and 
then asserted in the Branzburg dissent.
281
 The Miami Herald also argued that 
compelling eyewitness testimony would have a chilling effect on the 
newsgathering process.
282
 
The court rejected the arguments brought by the Miami Herald and the 
reporter.
283
 It found that no privilege existed when a reporter was a witness to 
relevant events.
284
 A reporter would be required to testify as to those observations 
in “a subsequent court proceeding.”285 Because there was no privilege, no 
balancing test was necessary, and Morgan and Huffstetler were distinguishable 
from the case at issue.
286
 The court, in finding that no privilege existed, also 
declined to address the merits of the three-prong test being utilized by the Florida 
appellate courts.
287
  
 ________________________  
 272. Id. at 579–80. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.  
 280. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548–50 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 281. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744–47 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 282. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (The Florida Supreme Court did not distinguish between a civil or 
criminal proceeding). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 580 n.4. 
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The court expressed its support for, and recognized the importance of, a 
vigorous and aggressive press.
288
 The court, however, took the following position: 
“[W]e fail to see how compelling a reporter to testify concerning his eyewitness 
observations of a relevant event in a criminal proceeding in any way ‘chills’ or 
impinges on the newsgathering process.”289 The court went on to say that its ruling 
did not hamper newsgathering and would not have the effect of making reporters 
reluctant to seek out news.
290
  
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that a reporter is like any other citizen who 
has a duty to come forward with relevant evidence.
291
 The court noted that 
“[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and . . . must give way in 
proper circumstances.”292 While the court recognized that journalists would be 
“somewhat inconvenienced,” it found that, as with every other citizen, such 
inconvenience would not serve as a basis for being excused from testifying.
293
 In 
conclusion, the Morejon majority reminded the parties that no authority existed 
supporting the proposition that there was a qualified privilege, which precluded 
reporters from testifying as to their own eyewitness observations.
294
 To the 
contrary, the court cited authority that showed other courts in the United States had 
found there to be no privilege when the journalist personally observed criminal 
activity.
295
  
The Morejon case contained one concurring opinion written by Justice 
Barkett.
296
 While Justice Barkett agreed with the conclusion that the reporter was 
not shielded to testify under the facts of the case, she was concerned with the 
breadth of the majority opinion.
297
 The concern was that the majority seemed to 
find that there was no First Amendment interest recognized when a reporter acts in 
a newsgathering capacity.
298
 Also, Justice Barkett was concerned that there was no 
balancing of respective interests utilized by the majority.
299
 She urged that the 
newsgathering process triggered First Amendment considerations because it was 
essential to the dissemination of news by the press.
300
 Justice Barkett noted that the 
majority should have concluded that First Amendment rights exist when a reporter 
personally eyewitnesses criminal activity.
301
 She maintained, however, that she 
 ________________________  
 288. Id. at 580–81. 
 289. Id. at 581.  
 290. Id. 
 291. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 581. 
 292. Id. at 581. 
 293. Id. Evidently, the term “somewhat inconvenienced” is less than being “inconvenienced.” It is 
incongruous for the Court to admit to some inconvenience on the one hand but deny that there is impingement “in 
any way” to a reporter on the other hand. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 581–82. 
 296. Id. at 582 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 297. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 582 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 298. Id.  
 299. Id.  
 300. Id. (citing Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976)). 
 301. Id.  
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would balance that interest under the facts of the case and still arrive at the same 
result as the majority.
302
      
The Morejon case raises a number of questions. As Justice Barkett opined, the 
majority analysis appeared to find that no First Amendment interest is impacted 
when a reporter is an eyewitness to a criminal event.
303
 Because a reporter operates 
under the First Amendment freedom of the press, is not the First Amendment 
always a consideration when, in a newsgathering capacity, the reporter obtains 
information from a confidential source or observes an event as an eyewitness? The 
entire court took the position that a reporter was no different from any other 
citizen.
304
 Because every citizen has a duty to testify, the reporter must also testify 
when called upon.
305
 But is the reporter the same as every other citizen? The 
reporter claimed protection under the First Amendment right of freedom of the 
press.
306
 The average citizen has no claim to protection under freedom of the 
press.
307
 The average citizen is not a member of the press. The reporter is a member 
of the press and works within the rights guaranteed by the freedom of the press 
clause within the First Amendment.
308
 Therefore, a reporter is not the same as 
every other citizen. 
The majority asserted that the First Amendment is not impacted at all except, 
perhaps, “journalists may be somewhat inconvenienced.”309 Did the Florida 
Supreme Court give adequate consideration to the impact its decision would have 
on the freedom of the press? Being subpoenaed to testify at a grand jury 
proceeding, at a deposition, or at a trial is time consuming. The press cannot be free 
to publish news if reporters are sitting in a deposition or waiting in a witness room 
for extended periods of time. The press is not free if its reporters, who gather news 
under the Constitution, are taken away from their newsgathering capacity. The 
press is impacted when its journalists become witnesses. 
By forcing a reporter to be a participant in the justice system, the First 
Amendment is impacted.
310
 It is impacted not only in terms of time, but also in 
terms of objectivity.
311
 A free press relies on the belief that it is neutral and 
objective
312—traits that freedom brings to it. By becoming a participant in the 
criminal justice system, reporters, and in turn the press, place their objectivity into 
question.
313
 Are they then the arm of the government or the criminal defendant? 
Regardless of the answer, an important component of a free press is diminished.  
 ________________________  
 302. Id.  
 303. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 582–83 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 304. Id. at 581 (majority opinion). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 578. 
 307. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 581. 
 310. Id. at 582. 
 311. See id. at 581 (Barkett, J., concurring). 
 312. Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
665, 729 n.242 (2007). 
 313. Josh Sager, How “Neutral” Reporting Is Biased, THE BOSTON OCCUPIER (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://bostonoccupier.com/how-neutral-reporting-is-biased/. 
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While Morejon involved a criminal case,
314
 would the same rule apply in a 
civil case? Will journalists be called as witnesses in civil cases such as personal 
injury, contracts, tenant evictions, and probate contests? The answer appears to be 
yes. The court did not distinguish between a reporter who observes a criminal event 
or a civil event.
315
 The general rule as stated by the Florida Supreme Court is: “We 
adhere to the district court’s conclusion that there is no privilege, qualified, limited, 
or otherwise, which protects journalists from testifying as to their eyewitness 
observations of a relevant event in a subsequent court proceeding.”316 No 
distinction is made by the court between a criminal or civil proceeding.
317
 If a 
reporter is an eyewitness to a relevant event, they become duty-bound to testify in a 
subsequent proceeding.
318
 That subsequent proceeding may be a grand jury, a 
deposition, or a trial—whether the matter is criminal or civil.  
Is this court, as well as other courts, so focused on Sixth Amendment 
considerations that it is unable to consider the First Amendment? Why, as between 
the two amendments, should the Sixth Amendment prevail? Is the Sixth 
Amendment more important than the First? Should they not equally stand on their 
own, providing rights and protections to their respective citizens that our founders 
intended to protect? Courts should recognize that the First and Sixth Amendments 
have equal value, and should rule accordingly.  
Those are just a few of the questions that the Morejon decision raised. The 
Florida Supreme Court will address the reporter’s privilege again.319 More 
questions will be answered in this area and more questions will be raised as a result 
of the dynamics between the First and Sixth Amendments.  
D.   CBS, Inc. v. Jackson 
Less than a year after deciding the Morejon case, the Florida Supreme Court 
would once again address the reporter’s privilege in 1991.320 In CBS, Inc. v. 
Jackson, the court also faced the demands of a criminal defendant with drug 
charges, who was seeking information from a journalist to assist in the defense of 
his case.
321
 However, the CBS, Inc. case involved a television journalist instead of a 
print reporter.
322
 The court saw no distinction between the two professions, nor did 
the court extend a reporter’s privilege in this case.323  
Jackson was a defendant arrested by police for the charge of possession of 
cocaine.
324
 Law enforcement was conducting a drug enforcement operation that a 
 ________________________  
 314. See Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578 (Barkett, J., concurring). 
 315. See id. at 577–82. 
 316. Id. at 580. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. See CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 699. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
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CBS news team was videotaping.
325
 CBS videotaped portions of the law 
enforcement operation and broadcasted parts of it on television.
326
 Jackson’s 
defense attorney sought portions of the videotapes that pertained to his client, 
which were not televised, and were referred to as “outtakes.”327 The defense 
wanted to view the outtakes in order to prepare for trial.
328
  
CBS refused to provide the tapes to the defendant.
329
 It claimed that the 
outtakes were protected work product under the reporter’s qualified privilege.330 
The trial court found that the privilege was “inapplicable because the information 
was not from a confidential source.”331 The trial court also found that if the 
qualified privilege applied, the defendant carried the burden to show the need to 
disclose the outtakes.
332
  
CBS argued that as journalists operating under the First Amendment, they had 
a qualified privilege against the forced disclosure of any information obtained in a 
newsgathering capacity.
333
 CBS maintained that in order to overcome the privilege, 
the party seeking the information must satisfy a three-prong test.
334
 This was the 
same three-prong test that was argued in previous cases before the Florida Supreme 
Court, which was set forth in the Garland case and the Branzburg dissent, and 
adopted and applied by a number of appellate courts post-Branzburg.
335
  
In a per curiam opinion, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the existence of a 
qualified privilege in the CBS, Inc. case after briefly analyzing Branzburg, 
Morgan, Huffstetler, and its most recent privilege case at the time, Morejon.
336
 The 
court saw no distinction between the Morejon case and the case before it.
337
 The 
majority stated, “[f]rom a [F]irst [A]mendment privilege standpoint, we can 
perceive no significant difference in the examination of an electronic recording of 
an event and verbal testimony about the event.”338 
The analysis was virtually identical to that in Morejon.
339
 The court found no 
implication of confidential sources and no basis for the argument that the First 
Amendment was impacted at all by its decision to disclose the videotapes of 
Jackson’s arrest.340 The majority found that there was only a minor inconvenience 
to the media, not a constitutional impingement.
341
 The CBS, Inc. court applied no 
 ________________________  
 325. CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 
(2d Cir. 1958). 
 336. CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699–700. 
 337. Id. at 700. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
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balancing test because it believed that a qualified privilege did not exist in this 
case.
342
 According to the court, a reporter who observes criminal conduct as an 
eyewitness and a television journalist who records observations on videotape were 
the same.
343
  
Interestingly, in the majority’s conclusion, the court suggested to CBS that its 
time was better spent on the issue of recovering costs.
344
 “While CBS seeks to 
implicate the [F]irst [A]mendment, we think that its concern is more legitimately 
directed toward the trouble and expense of having to furnish the video outtakes.”345 
The court then provided the basis for CBS to seek recovery of costs with authority 
under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent authority of the court, 
even though this was not the issue before the court.
346
 While the court was looking 
at reimbursable costs, CBS was looking at a more precious cost—the First 
Amendment.
347
  
There were also two concurring opinions.
348
 Justice McDonald concurred in 
part and dissented in part.
349
 He agreed with the majority view that a reporter has 
no qualified privilege against disclosing physical evidence of a crime or 
observations of a crime.
350
 Justice McDonald’s dissent was based on the view that 
the videotapes were property belonging to CBS, a nonparty. As such, the party 
seeking the property has the burden of going forward to prove that the material is 
relevant, there is no alternative source, and there is a need for the information.
351
 
The burden was basically a three-prong test.
352
 Justice McDonald’s concern was 
not the First Amendment, but the interruption of any business activity or 
interference with work product.
353
 
The other concurring opinion was by Justice Barkett, who agreed with the 
result reached by the majority because Morejon was controlling.
354
 However, she 
continued to assert the position she held in Morejon: the First Amendment is 
always implicated when journalists are engaged in their newsgathering capacity.
355
 
Whether evidence is admissible then depends upon the results of the balancing test 
in considering the issue of admissibility.
356
 
Morgan and Huffstetler represented an expansion and recognition of First 
Amendment rights through a qualified reporter’s privilege.357 The cases that 
 ________________________  
 342. CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 700.  
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991). 
 348. Id. at 701 (McDonald, J. and Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. (McDonald, J., concurring in part). 
 351. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting in part). 
 352. Id.  
 353. CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 701. 
 354. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part). 
 355. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting in part). 
 356. Id. 
 357. See Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 
1976). 
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followed neither expanded nor recognized First Amendment rights or a qualified 
reporter’s privilege within the context of the facts of the cases.358 Morejon and 
CBS, Inc. marked an erosion of the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida.359 The 
Florida Supreme Court held there is no protection in the form of a privilege when a 
reporter witnessed or recorded a crime; in situations where no privilege is attached, 
there is no requirement to conduct the balancing test analysis.
360
  
Justice Barkett’s position in both cases has merit. Her view is that the First 
Amendment is implicated whenever a journalist is working in a newsgathering 
capacity, and that a balancing test should be applied whenever a journalist has 
information that is sought as evidence in a trial proceeding.
361
 Why should there be 
exceptions to the privilege if the journalist is working under the free-press clause 
and accumulating information? Granted, the Sixth Amendment has a need for this 
information, but the value of the First Amendment should be acknowledged and 
respected also. They are co-equal amendments. If there is not going to be an 
absolute privilege precluding disclosure of a reporter’s information, then a 
balancing test would be better than no test at all. 
VI.  THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE: 1998 
In 1998, the Florida Legislature enacted a reporter’s privilege statute, which 
became effective in May of that same year.
362
 Perhaps the legislature’s actions 
were a response to the erosion of First Amendment rights, the inconsistent 
application of varying standards to the reporter’s privilege, the lack of clarity in 
free-press cases, and the continued jailing of journalists in the state.  
Some viewed the enactment of the statutory privilege as a victory for the 
media, in that the journalist’s privilege finally gained legislative approval.363 The 
thought was that legislation would guide judges through the privilege and its 
application, and there would be consistency in Florida courts applying the 
reporter’s privilege.364 
Others would argue that the statutory privilege was a defeat for the media.
365
 
The argument was that the First Amendment is a constitutional protection for the 
press against governmental interference and that the First Amendment neither 
permits nor needs a legislative privilege among common law privileges.
366
 The 
 ________________________  
 358. See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698; Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990). 
 359. See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698; Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577.  
 360. See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698. 
 361. See id.; Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577. 
 362. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998). 
 363. See generally Sanford L. Bohrer & Susan H. Aprill, Reporter’s Qualified Privilege, FLORIDA BAR, 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/RHandbook01.nsf/1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/e8a24671dbdb7
fdb852569cb004cab2f!OpenDocument (updated Sept. 2007) (discussing the judicial and legislative history behind 
Florida’s journalist privilege, and the enactment of section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes). 
 364. Id. 
 365. See generally Kurt Wimmer & Stephen Kiehl, Who Owns the Journalist’s Privilege—the Journalist or 
the Source?, 28 COMMS. LAW. 9 (August 2011) (“Lowering the bar for when a journalist will disclose confidential 
information could redound to the detriment of an entire news organization or, if it happened often enough, the 
industry itself.”). 
 366. Id. at 12 n.53. 
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statute itself could be interpreted as an impingement on the Constitution.
367
 Also, in 
terms of its strength as a privilege, it could be considered weak.
368
 
Irrespective of the varying views on the merits of the legislation, the statutory 
reporter’s privilege gained legislative approval.369 Whether there should be a 
statutory privilege of a constitutional protection is a valid theoretical question. The 
pragmatic answer to the question is that, based on decided cases, the need for the 
journalist’s privilege became evident. The statute is set out in its entirety below. 
VII.  THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE: FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 90.5015 
(1) Definitions: For purposes of this section, the term: 
 
(a) “Professional journalist” means a person regularly engaged in 
collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or 
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the 
information sought while working as a salaried employee of, or 
independent contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news 
agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, 
network, or news magazine. Book authors and others who are not 
professional journalists, as defined in this paragraph, are not 
included in the provisions of this section. 
 
(b) “News” means information of public concern relating to local, 
statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events. 
 
(2) Privilege: A professional journalist has a qualified privilege 
not to be a witness concerning, and not to disclose the information, 
including the identity of any source, that the professional journalist 
has obtained while actively gathering news. This privilege applies 
only to information or eyewitness observations obtained within the 
normal scope of employment and does not apply to physical 
evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording of 
crimes. A party seeking to overcome this privilege must make a 
clear and specific showing that: 
 
(a) The information is relevant and material to unresolved issues 
that have been raised in the proceeding for which the information 
is sought; 
 ________________________  
 367. See John K. Edwards, Should There Be Journalist’s Privilege Against Newsgathering Liability?, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/spring00/edwards.html (last visited Nov. 29, 
2013). 
 368. See generally Holli Hartman, The Erosion of the Reporter’s Privilege, THE SOC’Y OF PROF. 
JOURNALISTS (Sept. 1997), available at https://www.spj.org/pdf/pkr1997.pdf (discussing the weaknesses and 
“erosion” of the journalist’s privilege). 
 369. Bohrer & Aprill, supra note 363. 
27
: A Reporter's Privilege in Florida
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013
120 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 1 
 
 
(b) The information cannot be obtained from alternative sources; 
and 
 
(c) A compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the 
information. 
 
(3) Disclosure: A court shall order disclosure pursuant to 
subsection (2) only of that portion of the information for which the 
showing under subsection (2) has been made and shall support 
such order with clear and specific findings made after a hearing. 
 
(4) Waiver: A professional journalist does not waive the privilege 
by publishing or broadcasting information. 
 
(5) Construction: This section must not be construed to limit any 
privilege or right provided to a professional journalist under law. 
 
(6) Authentication: Photographs, diagrams, video recordings, 
audio recordings, computer records, or other business records 
maintained, disclosed, provided, or produced by a professional 
journalist, or by the employer or principal of a professional 
journalist, may be authenticated for admission in evidence upon a 
showing, by affidavit of the professional journalist, or other 
individual with personal knowledge, that the photograph, diagram, 
video recording, audio recording, computer record, or other 
business record is a true and accurate copy of the original, and that 
the copy truly and accurately reflects the observations and facts 
contained therein. 
 
(7) Accuracy of evidence: If the affidavit of authenticity and 
accuracy, or other relevant factual circumstance, causes the court 
to have clear and convincing doubts as to the authenticity or 
accuracy of the proffered evidence, the court may decline to admit 
such evidence. 
 
(8)  Severability: If any provision of this section or its application 
to any particular person or circumstance is held invalid, that 
provision or its application is severable and does not affect the 
validity of other provisions or applications of this section.
370
 
 ________________________  
 370. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998). 
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A.   Florida Statute Section 90.501 in Relation to Section 90.5015 
Florida recognizes a number of privileges.
371
 Section 90.501 allows a person 
asserting a privilege to refuse to be a witness, refuse to disclose any matter, refuse 
to produce any object or writing, or prevent another from doing any of the 
aforementioned.
372
 While privileges have been based in the common law and the 
federal and state constitutions, the Florida Evidence Code enacted by the 
legislature acknowledges these privileges.
373
 Privileges in Florida no longer look to 
the judiciary for creation and their existence.
374
  
Statutes in Florida provide that privileges that are defined by the legislature, as 
well as federal and state constitutions, will be honored.
375
 Importantly, the Florida 
Evidence Code recognizes privileges that the legislature has approved to protect 
interests or relationships that it deems worthy of protection.
376
 The impact of these 
privileges, including the journalist’s privilege, is to sacrifice facts in the 
administration of justice because the interest protected is important to society.
377
  
The essence of what is protected is the communication that takes place in a 
recognized privileged relationship.
378
 In Florida, these relationships include, but are 
not limited to, the lawyer-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege, the 
accountant-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the clergy-
penitent privilege, and the focus of this paper, the journalist’s privilege.379 In May 
of 1998, the journalist’s privilege, as set out in Florida Statute section 90.5015, 
joined the other privileges in the Florida Evidence Code.
380
 
B.   Florida Statute Section 90.5015(1): Who May Assert Privilege? 
Before providing who may assert the journalist’s privilege, the legislature 
defined who that person may be.
381
 The Code announces that the journalist who 
may assert the privilege is a “professional journalist.”382 The section then defines 
who is a professional journalist.
383
 To qualify as a “professional journalist,” the 
person must be regularly engaged in gathering or publishing news for some form of 
the print media, radio, or television.
384
 Importantly, the person involved in the 
newsgathering or publishing capacity must be doing so for gain or livelihood.
385
 
The newsgatherer must be a salaried employee or independent contractor for one of 
 ________________________  
 371. See §§ 90.5015–.5055 
 372. § 90.5015(2). 
 373. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 285 (2002). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. EHRHARDT, supra note 373, at 285. 
 380. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998). 
 381. § 90.5015(1)(a). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
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the news agencies listed.
386
 The section then explicitly states who is not a 
professional journalist, thereby, being incapable of exerting the privilege.
387
 Book 
authors, who are not professional journalists, are listed and are, therefore, excluded 
from asserting the privilege.
388
  
The definition section of the statute raises a number of questions. While the 
legislature addressed conventional newsgathering forums such as newspapers, 
radio, and television, the legislature did not address whether the Internet is included 
or excluded from the definition of a professional journalist.
389
 More specifically, 
may a person who gathers and publishes news over the Internet qualify as a 
professional journalist? May an internet reporter assert the journalist’s privilege? 
The answer should be yes. While its form may be different, the Internet serves the 
present day function of the newspaper, the radio, and the television in terms of 
informing people of the news.
390
 The form should not matter. The key requirements 
should be the gathering and publishing of news; the Internet satisfies this 
requirement.
391
  
An additional question is what is meant by gain? Must a court look at the 
adequacy of consideration similar to a contract analysis? In contract disputes, 
courts will look at the issue of legal sufficiency rather than whether the 
consideration is adequate.
392
 Must the gain only be in United States currency? 
Would anything of value be a gain? Since the statute used the term “gain,” 
arguably anything of value would be legally sufficient.
393
  
Would a reporter for a school newspaper qualify as a professional reporter? 
While a student may claim that he or she is a newsgatherer, the issue of gain comes 
into play. There is no monetary incentive. On the other hand, if college credit is 
being applied or experience is considered, then this may be considered a type of 
gain. The student must still pass the hurdle of being a salaried employee or an 
independent contractor for the news agency. Because a student acts as a 
newsgatherer, obtains credit or experience as a gain, and has a relationship with the 
school newspaper, it could be argued that a student may satisfy the requirements of 
the statute.  
The relationship with a news agency is important. Another question is whether 
a freelance journalist falls within the definition of this section. If the freelance 
journalist has a relationship with a news entity mentioned in the statute, then 
arguably he or she would qualify as an independent contractor for the news agency. 
If there is no formal relationship established prior to the newsgathering, then the 
 ________________________  
 386. Id. 
 387. § 90.5015(1)(a). 
 388. Id. 
 389. § 90.5015. 
 390. Pew Research Center, In Changing News Landscape, Even Television Is Vulnerable: Trends in News 
Consumption: 1991–2012, PEW RESEARCH: CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-even-television-is-vulnerable/. 
 391. See generally id. (discussing the transformation of news platforms from traditional print newspaper to 
the internet). 
 392. ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS LAW: EXCERPTED CASES 
186 (2d ed. 2010).  
 393. § 90.5015(1)(a) (1998). 
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analysis becomes more problematic. While the argument may be made that a 
freelance journalist receives a gain or livelihood, the statute speaks specifically of 
either a salaried employee or an independent contractor for the news agency. The 
relationship, apparently, must be established first for the privilege to be asserted.  
Also, may a book author qualify under the statute if he or she is also a reporter 
for a news agency? The Code speaks only about a book author who is not a 
professional journalist.
394
 Arguably, a book author who has a relationship at the 
same time with the news media and is working in a journalistic capacity would be 
able to assert the privilege. On the other hand, if an author had no relationship with 
a news agency, then there would be no privilege because the author would not meet 
the definition of a professional journalist under this section. 
C.   Florida Statute Section 90.5015(2): When Privilege May Be Asserted 
The legislature has clearly stated that the journalist’s privilege is not 
absolute.
395
 It is a qualified privilege.
396
 The privilege attaches to a defined 
journalist who is gathering news information while in a reporter capacity.
397
 The 
privilege would shield the reporter from being a witness and would shield the 
reporter from having to disclose information.
398
 Most importantly, this section 
provides protection to not only confidential sources, but also non-confidential 
sources.
399
 The statute settles the issue of confidentiality or non-confidentiality 
faced by Florida courts. 
The privilege is qualified because even when the privilege applies, it still may 
be overcome. If there is a sufficient policy interest that outweighs the privilege, a 
reporter will have to testify and disclose information, which then requires applying 
the three-prong test set out in the statute.
400
 The three-prong test is based on the 
dissent from Branzburg and has been adopted by a large number of courts post-
Branzburg.
401
  
The State v. Davis decision from the Florida Supreme Court added another 
burden or prong upon a trial court’s application of the balancing test.402 In 
determining the compelling need of a criminal defendant, the trial court must factor 
into the equation the federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and 
due process to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
403
 This added 
requirement, or fourth prong, is not set out by the legislature in the journalist’s 
privilege statute.
404
  
 ________________________  
 394. Id. 
 395. § 90.5015(2). 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972). 
 402. State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998). 
 403. Id. 
 404. § 90.5015(2). 
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The standard to overcome the privilege is a clear and specific showing that 
appears to be more than a preponderance standard, yet, less than a reasonable doubt 
standard.
405
 It seems to be compatible with a clear and convincing standard. 
Specifically excluded from the privilege are matters noted in Florida cases. The 
privilege does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or 
recordings of crimes.
406
 This is consistent with previous rulings made by the 
Florida Supreme Court.
407
 
D.   Florida Statute Section 90.5015(4): Waiver of Privilege 
This section provides that a waiver of the privilege does not occur when there 
is publication or broadcasting of the information.
408
 This section recognizes that a 
newsgathering entity is going to publish or disseminate information in the normal 
course of its business capacity.
409
 If the information is disseminated in the normal 
course of the media process, then a waiver of the privilege cannot be claimed 
against the reporter or news agency that asserts the privilege.
410
 Because the statute 
is silent as to other situations, a waiver may occur when not precluded by this 
section.
411
 
E.   Florida Statute Section 90.5015(6): Authentication 
This section allows authentication of evidence such as, photographs, 
recordings, and records by an affidavit from a professional journalist who has 
knowledge of the evidence that is being sought to be admitted.
412
 As an 
accommodation to journalists, this procedure would allow for the admission of 
documentary evidence without the need for the particular journalist to wait to 
testify or to testify in court. Perhaps this is a legislative recognition of the 
newsgathering process under the First Amendment. Rather than waiting in court to 
authenticate a document, the journalist can continue his work without interference 
under these circumstances.  
VIII.   LATER FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASES 
A.   State v. Davis 
May of 1998 was an important year for the reporter’s privilege in Florida. The 
legislature enacted the state’s first shield law.413 On October 22, 1998, the Florida 
 ________________________  
 405. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 581–82 (Fla. 1990). 
 408. § 90.5015(4). 
 409. Id. 
 410. See infra Ulrich v. Coast Dental Serv., 739 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 411. See infra News Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 412. § 90.5015(6). 
 413. § 90.5015. 
32
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/4
Fall 2013 A Reporter's Privilege in Florida 125 
 
Supreme Court decided three cases dealing with the reporter’s privilege.414 The 
court would do so without basing their decisions on the new Florida statute. The 
first case decided was State v. Davis.
415
 The facts of the first case preceded the 
passage of the journalist’s statute, according to the Davis decision.416 It was not 
referenced in the other two.  
Merlan Davis was a man who had a relationship with a woman named Nicole 
Terry.
417
 She saw the error of her ways and terminated the relationship in January 
of 1990.
418
 Davis did not understand the concept of terminating a relationship and 
continued to pursue Terry.
419
 His pursuit was unwelcomed.
420
 Davis’ behavior 
became hostile.
421
 He repeatedly called and threatened Terry.
422
 He left a message 
on her answering machine that he was going to kill her.
423
 Davis also had 
threatened to kill a police officer who had gone to Terry’s home and answered her 
phone.
424
 In May of 1991, Terry obtained an injunction that prevented future 
contact.
425
 Davis paid little attention to the injunctive order.
426
 On several 
occasions, Davis continued to follow and harass Terry.
427
 One day, he followed her 
in his vehicle and cut her off while she was driving, almost causing an accident.
428
  
In December of 1991, an incident occurred that gave rise to criminal charges 
against Davis.
429
 While driving over the Skyway Bridge, Terry saw Davis close 
behind her in his vehicle.
430
 He was beeping his horn and waving a gun out of the 
window.
431
 Terry tried to elude Davis by driving fast.
432
 A reckless pursuit ensued 
and ended when Davis’ car slammed into the rear of Terry’s car.433 She had tapped 
her brakes lightly hoping he would back off, but he was traveling so close behind 
her that she could not see his headlights.
434
 Terry lost control of her vehicle and 
smashed into cement dividers.
435
 Davis maintained that, because Terry applied the 
brakes, she intended to cause the accident, not Davis.
436
 He argued her conduct 
 ________________________  
 414. State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 1998). See infra Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998); 
see infra Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. Frangie 720 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1998). 
 415. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 220. 
 416. Id. at 224. 
 417. Id. at 222. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222. 
 422. Id. at 229. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at 222. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 229. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 222. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 229. 
 432. Id. 
 433. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222. 
 434. Id. at 229. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 222. 
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negated proof of any specific intent to cause her harm.
437
 Davis was charged and 
convicted at trial of aggravated assault with a motor vehicle.
438
 
Diane Mason was a reporter with the St. Petersburg Times. She wrote an article 
on domestic violence and featured the events and accident involving Davis and 
Terry.
439
 Mason interviewed Terry for the article and discussed the events 
surrounding the accident.
440
 After reading the article, Davis’ attorney wanted to 
depose the journalist prior to trial about any statements the victim made to her 
about the case.
441
 The newspaper would not cooperate with the defense attorney.
442
 
As a result, he filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum.
443
 A hearing was held on 
the motion before the trial judge.
444
 
The attorney for the newspaper argued that the Second District Court of 
Appeal had ruled in this area and had adopted a three-prong test for determining 
when a reporter is privileged from testifying.
445
 The appellate court required the 
three-prong test for any proceeding, civil or criminal, when information was sought 
from a reporter, whether the information was from a confidential or non-
confidential source.
446
 The trial court applied the three-prong test and ruled that 
Davis did not carry his burden for disclosure because he failed to show that the 
information was unavailable from an alternative source.
447
 Not only had the victim 
admitted to the braking, but she also told another witness this same information.
448
 
On appeal, the Second District rejected its previous position based on the 
Florida Supreme Court’s recent rulings in the Morejon and the CBS, Inc. cases.449 
The appellate court interpreted those cases to limit the privilege to confidential 
sources only.
450
 As a result, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial 
judge.
451
 The Second District Court of Appeals certified the issue in the form of a 
question to the Florida Supreme Court.
452
  
The Florida Supreme Court answered the question at the beginning of its 
ruling.
453
 The majority opinion in Davis was written by Justice Overton, the same 
justice who issued the sole dissent in Morgan.
454
 The Davis court found that the 
reporter’s qualified privilege in Florida applied in situations involving both 
confidential and non-confidential sources.
455
 However, the court immediately 
 ________________________  
 437. Id. at 229. 
 438. Id. at 220. 
 439. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222. 
 440. Id. at 229. 
 441. Id. at 222. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 223. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 223. 
 452. Id. at 220–21. 
 453. Id. at 222. 
 454. Id. at 221. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 958 (Fla. 1976). 
 455. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222. 
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cautioned in its opinion that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and due process 
rights must be considered when determining whether to preclude disclosure of 
information.
456
 
After addressing the facts of the case, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the 
history of the reporter’s privilege starting with Branzburg.457 The court reviewed 
the majority opinion, Justice Powell’s concurrence, and the dissent in Branzburg; 
then the court conducted its own analysis of the privilege starting with Morgan and 
Huffstetler.
458
 The court noted that it had adopted Justice Powell’s concurrence in 
those two cases.
459
 It also acknowledged that those two cases involved the qualified 
reporter’s privilege in the context of confidential information sought by the 
government.
460
 
The court then reviewed its decisions in Morejon and CBS, Inc.
461
 It noted that 
in those two cases, the information sought was by the defendant in a criminal 
context that involved eyewitness observations and the visual recording of a 
crime.
462
 The court stated again the position that no privilege, whatsoever, attaches 
in the situation where the journalist is an eyewitness to an event.
463
 Moreover, 
when a defendant, as in CBS, Inc., seeks to obtain relevant physical evidence 
recorded electronically, there is no privilege.
464
 The court saw no distinction 
between the electronic recordings of the events of a crime and the reporter’s 
eyewitness observations.
465
 The court then capsulized what it had ruled to date on 
the journalist’s privilege: 
In summary, these cases reflect that this Court has adopted a 
qualified reporter’s privilege, at least in those cases involving 
confidential information; but we have indicated that, where a 
defendant seeks testimony or evidence, no such privilege exists to 
excuse reporters from testifying about their eyewitness 
observations or from providing physical material relevant to a 
crime.
466
 
After presenting the state of the privilege in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court 
then turned to the rights of the accused and noted it had not discussed this issue in 
either the Morejon or CBS, Inc. cases.
467
 The court quoted the Sixth Amendment 
and referenced the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution.
468
 The court 
 ________________________  
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. at 223. 
 458. Id. at 224. 
 459. Id. at 224–25. 
 460. Id. at 225. 
 461. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 225. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. at 226. 
 464. Id. See CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1991). 
 465. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 226. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
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next looked at how other states addressed the reporter’s privilege.469 The court 
noticed that there was one common theme when looking at how all of the states 
dealt with the reporter’s privilege.470 All of the state courts applied some form of 
the traditional three-prong test proposed by the Branzburg dissent.
471
  
After reviewing the other state decisions, the Florida Supreme Court set forth 
its new standard on the reporter’s privilege and referred to this new standard as a 
clarification on the limitations of the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida.472 
The court first explained that a qualified reporter’s privilege existed in Florida to 
both confidential and non-confidential information gathered in a journalistic 
capacity.
473
 Second, the court reaffirmed its position in Morejon and CBS, Inc. by 
announcing, as it had in the past, “that the privilege does not apply to eyewitness 
observations or physical evidence, including recordings, of a crime.”474  
The Florida Supreme Court then, for the first time, embraced and adopted the 
three-prong test, noting that it was a test being used by an overwhelming majority 
of the states.
475
 While the court embraced the three-prong test, it added an 
additional requirement to the test that could be considered either a fourth prong or a 
variance of the third prong.
476
 The variance, or fourth prong, required that the party 
seeking disclosure had to show a compelling need for the information.
477
 The 
Florida Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
When determining the compelling need of a defendant, however, a 
court not only must weigh the concerns expressed by Justice 
Powell; it also must factor into the equation the federal and Florida 
constitutional rights to compulsory and due process so as to ensure 
that the defendant receives a fair trial.
478
 
After enunciating this new standard with a varied third prong or new fourth 
prong, the court then addressed and scolded the media.
479
 “We emphasize that it is 
the court and not the reporter or the reporter’s publisher that determines whether 
the privilege acts to preclude disclosure.”480 The court then noted that there were 
instances in the country when reporters voluntarily testified in serious criminal 
cases without the threat of contempt.
481
  
 ________________________  
 469. Id. at 227. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227. 
 472. Id. (The court uses the term “clarify”). 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
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The court next noted that the ruling in Davis was compatible with the new 
statute passed by the legislature on a journalist’s privilege.482 This was the extent of 
the court’s analysis of the new statute that codified a reporter’s privilege. The 
Davis court then published section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes without further 
comment.
483
  
The Davis majority returned to the facts of the case before it and acknowledged 
a qualified privilege existed in the case.
484
 The majority emphasized that the 
defendant’s liberty was at stake and that the defendant’s interests in a fair trial and 
compulsory process were not factored into any balancing test.
485
 The trial court 
failed to consider the defendant’s interests appropriately.486 While this may have 
been an error, the court found it to be harmless error in light of the facts in the 
case.
487
 The statements in the newspaper article were consistent with the victim’s 
own statements at trial.
488
 Even if the victim told the reporter that she intentionally 
caused the accident, it would not have been sufficient to warrant a new trial.
489
 The 
facts, as they were, were egregious enough to establish the aggravated assault 
charge.
490
 The court found that there was “no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction,” and, in conclusion, affirmed the conviction and 
sentence.
491
 
Justice Wells wrote the only other opinion, which concurred in part and 
dissented in part with the majority.
492
 Justice Wells concurred with the result of the 
majority, the adoption of the three-prong test, and the exceptions to the journalist’s 
privilege.
493
 However, he dissented on the requirement by the majority to factor 
into the test the federal and Florida constitutional rights of the accused to 
compulsory and due process to ensure a fair trial.
494
 Justice Wells argued that it 
added additional confusion to the balancing test.
495
 Justice Wells also expressed 
concern that this new requirement appeared to be an additional factor or prong 
rather than the three-prong test enunciated in the new law, which he supported.
496
 
In conclusion, Davis is a case that fails to give equal value to the First 
Amendment. The court did recognize that the reporter’s privilege attached to both 
confidential and non-confidential sources, and it also adopted the three-prong 
test.
497
 However, the majority added an additional requirement to the three-prong 
 ________________________  
 482. Id. at 227–28. 
 483. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 228. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. at 229. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 230. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 230. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. at 227 (majority opinion). 
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test, which placed emphasis on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.498 The 
varied three-prong standard in Davis favors invading the journalist’s privilege and 
is contrary to the test set out by the legislature. The traditional three-prong test in 
the journalist’s privilege statute makes no mention of the additional requirement 
presented in the Davis decision.
499
 Even with the new statute before it, the Davis 
court essentially ignored it.  
B.   Kidwell v. State 
Kidwell v. State was the second of the three reporter’s privilege cases that the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled on in October of 1998.
500
 David Kidwell was a 
reporter who interviewed a defendant charged with first-degree murder of a 
child.
501
 The interview took place while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial.
502
 
The defendant also gave a confession to police.
503
 The prosecution sought to have 
Kidwell testify at trial and he was given the option of either testifying or going to 
jail.
504
 Without applying the three-prong test, the Palm Beach circuit judge jailed 
the reporter for seventy days.
505
 A federal judge eventually released Kidwell on a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pending the exhaustion of all appeals.
506
  
The Fourth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s contempt 
conviction and sentence and ruled that there was no qualified reporter’s privilege 
precluding the disclosure of non-confidential information in a criminal 
proceeding.
507
 The appellate court certified the question of the existence of a 
privilege when dealing with non-confidential information to the Florida Supreme 
Court.
508
 The court ruled as it had in Davis, and found that there was a privilege for 
non-confidential information.
509
  
Justice Overton wrote the decision for the majority in Kidwell.
510
 While finding 
that a privilege existed, the court also emphasized, as it had in Davis, that any 
balancing test must be applied with the court according “great weight to a 
defendant’s right to due process and compulsory process in evaluating whether the 
requested information should be disclosed.”511  
The court went on to say that in applying the three-prong test, Kidwell’s 
information was relevant.
512
 Even if the confession was also given to the police, it 
did not automatically mean the information was obtainable from an alternative 
 ________________________  
 498. Id. 
 499. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998). 
 500. Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 670 (Fla. 1998). 
 501. Id. at 671. 
 502. Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 503. Id. 
 504. Id. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. at 407. 
 507. Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998). 
 508. Id. 
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 510. Id. 
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source.
513
 A defendant would still have the opportunity to determine what 
specifically was said to each particular witness.
514
 One way to achieve that goal 
would be an in-camera hearing held by the trial judge.
515
 The judge would 
determine if the information was different and determine its importance for 
credibility purposes.
516
 The majority also said to keep in mind that a jury needs to 
hear and consider all relevant information at any trial.
517
 Mistakes are made if a 
jury does not have all the information.
518
 The Kidwell court opined that because the 
public has a confession through a reporter’s article, the jury should also have that 
information.
519
 However, the court cautioned that care should be taken so that the 
media does not become “an investigative arm of the government.”520 
In their conclusion, the majority again stated their position that if a reporter has 
direct evidence of a crime, the information is not privileged.
521
 Evidence of a crime 
would include personal observations and physical evidence—including recordings 
of a crime.
522
 The Kidwell court then boldly addressed confessions made to a 
reporter, leaving the First Amendment by the way side: “Like an eyewitness 
observation, a direct confession to a reporter is direct evidence of a crime that 
would not fall within the information protected under the qualified privilege.”523 
In essence, the Kidwell court reaffirmed the general proposition that there is a 
privilege for non-confidential information.
524
 When considering whether to allow 
such testimony over objection, the trial judge must apply the three-prong test in-
camera before its admission.
525
 Yet, in its conclusion, the court unequivocally 
stated that a confession is evidence of a crime, which is no different from 
eyewitness observations.
526
 Because it is direct evidence, it falls outside the 
protection of a qualified privilege.
527
 Then, arguably, there is no need for a 
balancing test. Eyewitness testimony simply comes into evidence without the need 
to perform any balancing test.  
Furthermore, if a confession is no different from eyewitness observations, it 
makes no sense that the majority, earlier in its opinion, went through the analysis of 
the three-pronged test. Either a confession is an exception or it is not. If it is not, 
then a balancing test is needed. The decision is inconsistent at best, and is 
intellectually faulty at worst. From a First Amendment standpoint, the decision 
 ________________________  
 513. Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671. 
 514. Id. 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id. 
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 519. Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671. 
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recognizes only the interests of the accused and that of the government, which 
seeks to prosecute the crime. 
In the only concurring opinion, Justice Wells agreed with the result and relied 
upon his opinion in Davis.
528
 There, he mentioned his concern over the clarity of 
the balancing test.
529
 Justice Wells expressed concern over the issue of factoring in 
due process concerns and the compulsory process as part of the test, which he 
believed, would add confusion to the exactness of the test.
530
 
Justice Wells then expressed his approval of Judge Klein’s opinion from the 
Kidwell appellate court case.
531
 Judge Klein noted the inconsistency of federal 
courts and Florida courts in addressing the issue of, and standards for, non-
confidential sources.
532
 He also distinguished an eyewitness observation at the time 
of the crime from an interview by a reporter a long time after a crime has been 
committed.
533
 Judge Klein then expressed his First Amendment concerns over the 
admission of information from non-confidential sources.
534
 He considered any 
request for a reporter’s information to be a significant intrusion into the 
newsgathering process.
535
 Whenever a party seeks the information from a reporter 
involving a non-confidential source, Judge Klein believed that party had the burden 
of satisfying a three-prong test.
536
  
Although decided in October of 1998, the Kidwell court analyzed a confession 
contrary to the journalist’s statute enacted in May of the same year.537 The court 
ruled that confessions were direct evidence of a crime and no different from 
eyewitness observation of a crime.
538
 The analysis is intellectually weak. There is a 
distinction between observing a crime at the moment it is being committed, and 
receiving a statement from a defendant weeks or months after the commission of a 
crime. Furthermore, the legislature noted three exceptions to the privilege.
539
 The 
privilege “does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual 
or audio recording of crimes.”540 A confession is not enumerated as an exception to 
the privilege in the statute, it is not physical evidence like a gun or a knife, it is not 
an observation of a crime during its commission, and it is not a recording of a 
crime.  
Arguably, confessions are not an exception under the journalist’s privilege 
statute. As such, the statute would require a three-prong test be applied to such 
information to determine admissibility. The three-prong test is set out in the code 
 ________________________  
 528. Id. at 672 (Wells, J., concurring). 
 529. State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 230 (Fla. 1998). 
 530. Id. 
 531. Kidwell, 730 So. 2d. at 672 (Wells, J., concurring). See Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 406–09 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 532. Kidwell, 696 So. 2d. at 407. 
 533. Id. at 407–08. 
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 538. Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671. 
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and is not the test announced in Davis and Kidwell.
541
 Justice Overton’s opinion 
strains to recognize confessions as an exception to the privilege.
542
 It is also another 
example of the Florida Supreme Court giving priority to Sixth Amendment 
interests at the expense of free-press interests under the First Amendment. 
C.   Morris Communication v. Frangie 
The Frangie decision was the last of the three First Amendment cases decided 
by the Florida Supreme Court on October 22, 1998.
543
 The issue that reached the 
court was similar to the issue raised in the Davis decision. The Frangie case was a 
short opinion, perhaps because the court already addressed the issue in Davis.  
In Frangie, a reporter was served a subpoena in a civil, rather than a criminal, 
proceeding.
544
 Morris Communication brought a motion to quash before the trial 
court, which the judge denied.
545
 On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, relying on the rationale of the Second District 
Court of Appeals in the Davis decision.
546
 The First District Court of Appeals ruled 
that Florida law did not recognize a privilege for non-confidential sources for 
journalists.
547
 Because Frangie was in the context of a civil proceeding, the First 
District Court of Appeals certified the question of the reporter’s privilege in a civil 
proceeding to the Florida Supreme Court.
548
  
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue in the Frangie case by 
immediately quoting its own language in the Davis opinion: “[f]irst, we hold that a 
qualified reporter’s privilege exists in Florida and that such a privilege extends to 
both confidential and nonconfidential information gathered in the course of a 
reporter’s employment.”549 The court then reaffirmed its position that the privilege 
did not attach to “eyewitness observations or physical evidence, including 
recordings, of a crime.”550 The court found that once the privilege is recognized, 
the trial judge must apply the three-prong balancing test.
551
 
In essence, the court ruled that a qualified privilege applied in both criminal 
and civil proceedings, and then remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider a 
ruling on the motion to quash based on its decision in Davis as set out in 
Frangie.
552
 The court noted that its ruling in Frangie was basically a clarification 
of its ruling in Davis, as the latter involved a criminal proceeding while the former 
involved a civil proceeding.
553
  
 ________________________  
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Since the enactment of the journalist’s privilege statute in 1998, the Florida 
Supreme Court has not addressed another reporter’s privilege case since Frangie. 
We will have to wait until the court rules on a journalist’s privilege case to 
determine how the court will apply the statute together with its own body of cases. 
While this paper has mainly looked at Florida Supreme Court cases, it will now 
address Florida appellate court cases that have dealt with the issue.
554
 Below is a 
brief summary of those appellate cases followed by federal cases interpreting 
Florida law. 
IX. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS CASES  
A.   Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services 
In July of 1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeals decided the case of Ulrich 
v. Coast Dental Services.
555
 Ulrich was a television news reporter who was 
involved in a broadcast concerning Coast Dental.
556
 After the television broadcast, 
Coast Dental sued former employees for breach of their confidentiality 
agreements.
557
 Ulrich was subpoenaed by Coast Dental to identify the employees 
that Ulrich had spoken with concerning the investigative news piece.
558
 Ulrich 
moved to quash the subpoena.
559
 The trial judge denied the motion to quash and an 
appeal to the appellate court followed.
560
 
The Fifth District Court of Appeals began their analysis by citing the reporter’s 
privilege statute, recognizing that the statutory privilege applied to both 
confidential and non-confidential information.
561
 The trial court agreed that the 
privilege was attached, but found that there was a waiver based on Ulrich’s 
disclosure of the information to other parties.
562
 The issue was whether the 
journalist’s privilege was waived by the prepublication disclosure of the 
information.
563
 The appellate court looked at the distinction between the reporter’s 
privilege and other privileges that are based on the initial relationship of privacy.
564
 
The court also considered the First Amendment need to gather news from protected 
sources and relied on other state opinions that had ruled on the issue.
565
 The 
conclusion of the Fifth District Court of Appeals was that prepublication disclosure 
would not waive the privilege.
566
 
 ________________________  
 554. See, e.g., Ocala Star v. State, 721 So. 2d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (A motion to quash a subpoena 
issued on a reporter was rendered moot after the subpoena had been withdrawn. The reporter privilege statute was 
referenced in the decision). 
 555. Ulrich v. Coast Dental Servs., 739 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 556. Id. 
 557. Id. 
 558. Id. 
 559. Id. 
 560. Id. 
 561. Ulrich, 739 So. 2d at 143. 
 562. Id. 
 563. Id. 
 564. Id. 
 565. Id. at 143–44.  
 566. Id. at 144. 
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B.   News-Journal Corp. v. Carson 
In August of 1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeals again addressed the 
reporter’s privilege and analyzed the statutory privilege.567 In News-Journal Corp. 
v. Carson, the newspaper was sued by Carson for libel.
568
 Carson was a candidate 
for county judge.
569
 The newspaper attempted to protect from disclosure two 
documents—an unemployment compensation form and a job evaluation form—
that were sought in discovery, which were given to the newspaper by Carson.
570
  
The trial court ruled that the privilege did not bar discovery production because 
both documents were given to the newspaper by Carson.
571
 The Fifth District Court 
of Appeals cited the new privilege statute and acknowledged that many states had 
adopted a journalist’s privilege statute.572 The court noted that the first document 
was filed as part of the lawsuit in the public records.
573
 As a result, the court found 
this constituted a waiver under the statute and under the general waiver of privilege 
theory analysis.
574
 The second document, however, was not placed into the court 
record.
575
 Carson argued that the document was discoverable as physical evidence; 
therefore, the privilege would not apply.
576
 The court rejected this position.
577
 The 
appellate court then applied the three-prong test to the disclosure of the second 
document.
578
 The court found a strong public policy consideration in bringing libel 
actions.
579
 Because of the compelling need to meet the high burden in a libel case, 
the court decided that the privilege had to give way.
580
 The Fifth District Court of 
Appeals was concerned that a litigant would be denied his or her day in court if he 
or she were denied information necessary to prosecute a defamation case.
581
  
C.   State v. Famiglietti  
The Third District Court of Appeals looked at the statutory privilege in the case 
of State v. Famiglietti, decided in May of 2002.
582
 However, the specific privilege 
that was before the court was not the journalist’s privilege; it was the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
583
 The court indirectly addressed the journalist’s 
 ________________________  
 567. News-Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 568. Id. 
 569. Id. 
 570. Id. at 573–74. 
 571. Id. at 573. 
 572. Id. at 573–74. 
 573. News-Journal Corp., 741 So. 2d at 574. 
 574. Id.
 
 575. Id. 
 576. Id. 
 577. Id. at 575. 
 578. Id.  
 579. News-Journal Corp., 741 So. 2d at 576. 
 580. Id. 
 581. Id. 
 582. State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 583. Id. at 902. 
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privilege statute.
584
 The case was also an interesting contrast and comparison 
between a traditional common law privilege recognized by statute and the new 
statutory reporter’s privilege in Florida.585 
In the Famiglietti case, the defendant was charged with serious acts of 
domestic violence and attempted murder for beating his girlfriend nearly to death 
with a tire iron.
586
 The victim was deposed prior to trial.
587
 She testified at the 
deposition that she told her psychiatrist two other men had beaten her in the past.
588
 
She said this to protect her boyfriend, rather than revealing his identity as a 
perpetrator of violence.
589
 The defense then sought to subpoena all of the victim’s 
records from her psychiatrist in order to obtain evidence to attack the credibility of 
the victim.
590
 The trial court authorized the issuance of a subpoena, but ruled that it 
would determine in-camera what records would be released to the defense.
591
 The 
State appealed the ruling to the Third District Court of Appeals.
592
  
An original three-judge panel agreed that the privileged records could be 
ordered after the application of an unspecified balancing test.
593
 The original panel 
ruled, however, that the defense had not made a sufficient showing of a need to 
invade the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
594
 On its own motion, the appellate 
court set the case for a rehearing en banc.
595
 In an eleven-to-three vote, the court 
ruled that the Florida Evidence Code prohibited the disclosure of the victim’s 
communications to her psychiatrist because the communications were protected by 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
596
  
The majority maintained that this privilege was absolute, subject to exceptions 
that were inapplicable in the case before it.
597
 The dissent argued that the privilege 
was a qualified one that could and should be invaded to assure that the defendant 
secures a fair trial.
598
 The majority of eleven disagreed and ruled that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege was not a qualified privilege subject to a 
balancing test.
599
 The court pointed toward the journalist’s privilege statute and 
proclaimed that the legislature knew how to create a qualified privilege.
600
 They 
maintained that the legislature clearly created a qualified reporter’s privilege and 
could do so with any of the other privileges recognized by the Florida Evidence 
 ________________________  
 584. Id. at 904. 
 585. See Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901.  
 586. Id. at 902. 
 587. Id. 
 588. Id. 
 589. Id. 
 590. Id. 
 591. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 902–03. 
 592. Id. at 903. 
 593. Id. 
 594. Id. 
 595. Id. 
 596. Id. at 908. 
 597. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 904. 
 598. Id. 
 599. Id. 
 600. Id. 
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Code.
601
 By comparing the language of the two privileges, the majority ruled that 
the legislature simply had not created a qualified psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.
602
  
In an interesting contrast with the reporter’s privilege, the court looked at the 
policy considerations of protecting the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
603
 The 
court found that it was “sound” policy not to invade that privilege.604 It opined that 
invading a patient’s privacy would “eviscerate the effectiveness” of the 
confidential privilege.
605
 It shunned the idea that a balancing test had to be applied 
to protect a defendant’s fair trial and due process rights.606 The court stated that the 
right to confrontation and the right to cross-examination under the Sixth 
Amendment did not outweigh the application of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.
607
 The court further found that “the due process clause does not authorize 
the invasion of a generally-accepted testimonial privilege.”608 Such judicial 
deference is not articulated when reading Florida cases that address the reporter’s 
privilege.  
D.   TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll 
In December of 2009, the Fourth District Court of Appeals granted the 
petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the decision of the Fifteenth 
Judicial Circuit in the case of TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll.
609
 The lower court’s 
ruling required the petitioners to produce information claimed to be protected 
under Florida’s qualified journalist’s privilege and denied petitioners’ motion to 
compel the return of documents they claimed were inadvertently provided as part 
of discovery.
610
  
TheStreet.com, Inc. is a financial media company, internet website, and 
publisher.
611
 Melissa Ann Davis was the investigative reporter for the company, 
and also one of the petitioners. 
612
 TheStreet.com, Inc. published an article that 
included statements about Carroll, characterizing him as an insurance fraud felon, a 
con artist, and a troubling character.
613
 Carroll sued for defamation.
614
 He served a 
request to produce documents in connection with the materials gathered and the 
research conducted for preparation of the article.
615
 Petitioners invoked the Florida 
journalist’s privilege among their objections and produced certain documents that 
 ________________________  
 601. Id. at 904. 
 602. Id.  
 603. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 905. 
 604. Id. 
 605. Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996)). 
 606. Id. at 906. 
 607. Id. at 907. 
 608. Id. at 907–08. 
 609. TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So. 3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 610. Id. at 948. 
 611. Id. 
 612. Id. 
 613. Id.  
 614. Id. 
 615. TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 948. 
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they believed were covered by a tentative confidentiality agreement between the 
parties.
616
 However, petitioners also contended that they inadvertently produced 
two documents in which they failed to redact the identities of their confidential 
sources.
617
  
The trial court held that the Florida journalist’s privilege had been waived by 
the actions and pleadings of the petitioners, and ordered the petitioners to produce 
un-redacted documents totaling sixty of the 897 pages produced.
618
 The court also 
found that the journalist’s privilege had been used as a sword and a shield by the 
petitioners.
619
  
The district court held that certiorari lies to review orders compelling the 
production of documents and information claimed to be protected under the 
qualified journalist’s privilege in Florida.620 The district court found that the 
element of irreparable harm had been demonstrated, and that the trial court 
departed from the essential requirement of law when it ordered discovery 
notwithstanding petitioners’ assertion of the Florida journalist’s privilege.621 The 
district court also stated that the privilege is governed by section 90.5015 of the 
Florida Statutes, which expressly provides a “professional journalist” with a 
qualified privilege not to disclose the information, including the identity of any 
source that was obtained while the reporter was actively gathering news.
622
  
The court disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioners had 
asserted the privilege as both a sword and a shield.
623
 The court found that the 
discovery in dispute related to an affirmative defense and that even if the sword 
and shield doctrine applied, the proper remedy would have been to dismiss or strike 
petitioners’ defenses and to compel the production of the very information claimed 
to be privileged.
624
 The court also rejected the trial court’s suggestion that the 
petitioners failed to invoke the privilege unequivocally and at the earliest time.
625
 
The court further found that Carroll had failed to make the clear and specific 
showing required to overcome the privilege, and that the trial court failed to make 
the required clear and specific findings for such a result.
626
 Based on these findings, 
the court granted the petition and quashed the orders.
627
  
 ________________________  
 616. Id. 
 617. Id. 
 618. Id. at 949.  
 619. Id. 
 620. Id. 
 621. TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 949. 
 622. Id. 
 623. Id. 
 624. Id. 
 625. Id. 
 626. Id. at 950. 
 627. TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 950. 
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E.   WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh 
In the recent 2011 case of WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh,
628
 the Third District 
Court of Appeals granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, quashed the trial 
court’s order that granted Shehadeh’s motion to compel, and denied the motion by 
WTVJ and Burnside for a protective order.
629
 WTVJ, a television network affiliate, 
and its reporter, Jeff Burnside, sought a writ of certiorari to quash an order 
compelling Burnside to appear for a deposition on a limited topic relating to an 
earlier news broadcast.
630
 The broadcast covered a dispute between the City 
Counsel of the City of Homestead, Florida and its former City Manager, Mike 
Shehadeh.
631
  
The issue presented to the court was whether WTVJ and Burnside were 
entitled to a protective order under Florida’s journalist’s privilege statute.632 The 
appellate court found that WTVJ and Burnside were entitled to invoke the qualified 
privilege, and that Shehadeh did not make a clear and specific showing regarding 
two of the three elements identified in section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.
633
 In 
the motion to compel, Shehadeh sought the original of a CD diskette containing 
text messages, e-mails, and pin messages of employees and officials of the City of 
Homestead that was believed to have been turned over to the press.
634
 Pin messages 
are unencrypted text messages sent from one person’s handheld device to another’s 
without going through an intermediate server.
635
 Essentially, Shehadeh wanted to 
ask the reporter if the diskette was received through a public records request or if 
the information was leaked.
636
  
While the court found that WTVJ and Burnside were entitled to invoke the 
privilege, it questioned whether Shehadeh made a clear and specific showing of all 
three elements as required to overcome the limited privilege.
637
 The court found 
that while Shehadeh satisfied the first element, he failed to establish the second and 
third elements.
638
 The court stated that Shehadeh had an array of discovery 
procedures available to determine whether any of the City of Homestead 
commissioners or employees leaked information to Burnside, a professional 
journalist, without questioning Burnside.
639
 The court also found that the record 
presented in this case was precisely the kind of scenario in which the assertion of 
the privilege should be upheld.
640
 
 ________________________  
 628. WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh, 56 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 629. Id. at 105. 
 630. Id. 
 631. Id. 
 632. Id. 
 633. Id. at 105–06. 
 634. WTVJ-NBC 6, 56 So. 3d at 105. 
 635. Id. at 106 n.2. 
 636. Id. at 105.  
 637. Id. at 106. 
 638. Id. 
 639. Id. 
 640. WTVJ-NBC 6, 56 So. 3d at 106. 
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X.  THE NEW MEDIA 
When a reporter’s privilege was created in Florida by statute in 1998, the 
traditional media outlets included radio, television, newspapers, and magazines.
641
 
Today, the new media includes most forms of computer-enhanced 
communications.
642
 Most forms have an inherent interactive quality such as blogs, 
discussion boards, podcasting, social networking websites, and Wikis.
643
  
Blogging appears to be the predominant form and the fastest growing cultural 
oriented segment of the new media.
644
 This is due in part to the flexibility of the 
platform and that it can be maintained by a single individual.
645
 Conversely, social 
networking websites like Facebook, MySpace, and Meetup require a staff of full-
time employees to maintain the sites.
646
 Therefore, there is not as much variety as 
there is among bloggers. Blogging is also an excellent device for current events.
647
 
Many traditional media outlets incorporate blogs in their online offerings in an 
effort to remain connected to their readership.
648
 However, most bloggers are single 
authors who are usually not paid to generate content.
649
  
The Media Bloggers Association is trying to unite bloggers.
650
 They are a 
nonpartisan organization dedicated to supporting the development of blogging, or 
citizen journalism, as a distinct form of media.
651
 However, the simple declaration 
that bloggers are journalists does not afford them the shield law protection in many 
states.
652
  
Most states, including Florida, would not confer the privilege to most bloggers 
unless they meet the requirements of the definition of a “professional journalist” 
under section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.
653
 Section 90.5015 of the Florida 
Statutes requires that, in order to qualify as a “professional journalist,” a person 
must be regularly engaged in gathering or publishing the news for some form of 
print media, radio or television; they must be doing so for gain or livelihood, and 
they must be a salaried employee or independent contractor for one of the news 
agencies listed.
654
 As of yet, there are no cases in Florida that have addressed this 
issue.  
 ________________________  
 641. See Drew McManus, How to Connect With New Media: Part I, ADAPTISTRATION BLOG (Feb. 1, 2008), 
http://www.adaptistration.com/blog/2008/02/01/how-to-connect-with-new-media-part-1/. 
 642. Id. 
 643. Id.  
 644. Id. 
 645. Id. 
 646. Id. 
 647. McManus, supra note 641. 
 648. Id. 
 649. Id. 
 650. See A. Bauer, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Needs a 
Specific Test for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 747, 754 
n.47 (2009). 
 651. Id.  
 652. Id. 
 653. Id. at 747–48. 
 654. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1) (1998). 
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However, in a recent New Jersey case,
655
 the court ruled against a blogger 
finding that she produced no credentials or proof of affiliation with any recognized 
news agency, nor had she demonstrated adherence to any standard of professional 
responsibility regulating institutional journalism, such as editing, fact-checking, or 
disclosure of conflict of interest.
656
  
Furthermore, it is telling that the Florida legislature has not revised the 
journalist’s privilege statute since its creation in 1998. Evidently, the legislature 
has not felt a need to revise the statute, even with the onslaught of all new 
computer-enhanced communications.  
XI.  FEDERAL COURTS INTERPRET FLORIDA’S JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
A.   McCarty v. Bankers Insurance Company, Inc. 
The first federal court case to interpret and apply section 90.5015 of the Florida 
Statutes was the case of McCarty v. Bankers Insurance Company, Inc.
657
 McCarty 
sued his former employer, Bankers Insurance Company, Inc., as well as individual 
company officers and investigators for defamation and intentional interference with 
employment relationships following an illegal wiretapping of his phone.
658
 The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida issued protective 
orders permitting the disclosure of confidential materials for discovery, but 
reserving privilege claims.
659
  
Lucy Morgan was a reporter and chief of the Times Publishing Company’s 
Tallahassee news bureau.
660
 Morgan had interviewed individuals and obtained 
documents concerning the controversy between the Florida Department of 
Insurance and Treasurer (DOI), McCarty, and Banker’s Insurance, and had 
published a story in The St. Petersburg Times on June 18, 1996.
661
 McCarty sought 
information relevant to his claims through a subpoena for Morgan’s deposition.662 
The Times and Morgan moved for an order to quash the subpoena and asked for a 
protective order under the First Amendment privilege.
663
  
Morgan argued that the federal court should apply the federal common law 
regarding privileges because the central claim was based on the alleged violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2520.
664
 In regard to the state claims, Morgan argued that the law of 
Florida was “in disarray” with respect to the validity of a journalist’s privilege and, 
thus, was in conflict with federal law.
665
 
 ________________________  
 655. Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 656. Id. 
 657. McCarty v. Bankers Ins. Co., 195 F.R.D. 39 (N.D. Fla. 1998). 
 658. Id. at 40. 
 659. Id. at 41. 
 660. Id. at 44. 
 661. Id. 
 662. Id. 
 663. McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 44. 
 664. Id. 
 665. Id. 
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McCarty argued that the federal court should adopt the state law standard 
regarding a journalist’s privilege, which requires the journalist to bear the burden 
of showing a privilege exists.
666
 McCarty also argued that no conflict existed 
between federal and state law, therefore, the state law standard should apply to 
pending state claims for which the discovery was needed.
667
  
However, at the time the federal court considered the case in June of 1998, any 
conflict between Florida and federal common law had been resolved by the Florida 
legislature by the creation of a statutory journalist’s privilege section 90.5015 of 
the Florida Statutes.
668
 The court determined that application of either the federal 
common law standard or the newly announced Florida standard would yield the 
same result because the factors of each were virtually indistinguishable.
669
 In either 
case, the burden rested with McCarty, the party seeking to overcome the qualified 
privilege, to establish by clear and convincing evidence each of the three factors, 
which were considered the three-prong test.
670
  
After considering all of the factors together, the court agreed with The Times 
and Morgan that McCarty had failed to overcome his burden by clear and 
convincing evidence.
671
 Specifically, McCarty had failed to show that the 
information he sought from Morgan could not be obtained by other sources, like 
“press releases to show Bankers’ public statements about him and his alleged 
illegal behavior.”672 He could have also used the article itself “to establish the 
discrepancies in” the investigator’s stories.673 McCarty did not succeed in showing 
a compelling need for Morgan’s testimony; “he [could not] otherwise establish his 
entitlement to relief on his asserted claims.”674  
The court further surmised that despite McCarty’s showing that the 
information sought was relevant to his claims, that “relevancy [was] outweighed by 
the other factors” along with “the compelling need to uphold the journalist’s 
privilege which is so broadly recognized in the federal common law and the now 
applicable Florida statutory provisions of section 90.5015.”675 Based on that 
determination, the court granted the motion for a protective order and quashed the 
subpoena for Morgan’s deposition.676 The court also ordered that, “[a]bsent prior 
approval of [the] [c]ourt and a proper showing entitling a party to waiver of the 
journalist’s privilege, no further discovery shall be had . . . with respect to 
[Morgan’s] interviews with Bankers officials or with respect to her news gathering 
efforts.”677  
 ________________________  
 666. Id. at 44–45. 
 667. Id. 
 668. Id.  
 669. McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 46. 
 670. Id.  
 671. Id. at 47. 
 672. Id. 
 673. Id. 
 674. Id. 
 675. McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 47. 
 676. Id. at 48. 
 677. Id.  
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B.   Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office 
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, in 
the case of Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office,678 addressed the journalist’s 
privilege under Florida case law and section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.
679
 
Unlike the McCarty case, both parties agreed that the statute was the relevant 
standard.
680
 “The underlying action [was] for retaliation under Title VII and the 
Florida Civil Rights Act.”681 The action was brought by Green, a female police 
officer, against the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.682  
“Winston Dean, a local television news reporter, and [his employer,] 
Multimedia Holdings Corporation,” moved to quash Green’s subpoena for Dean’s 
testimony.
683
 Green alleged that Dean’s testimony was necessary to support her 
allegations of retaliation and was needed to elicit “the identity of the person who 
prompted [Dean] to prepare and broadcast” “a story about incompetent police 
officers featuring [Green] as an example of such.”684  
After addressing whether the “reporter possess[ed] relevant information; 
[whether] the information [could] be obtained from alternative sources; and 
[whether] there exist[ed] a compelling interest for requiring the reporter to disclose 
the information,” the court granted the motion to quash the subpoena.685 The court 
found that Green “failed to take advantage of all reasonable means to determine the 
identity of [the] individual.”686 Green “did not pursue the obvious vehicle of an 
interrogatory[,]” whereby, the defendant would have had “the burden of conducting 
[an] inquiry to determine whether one of its agents [contacted] Dean.”687 Therefore, 
because Green had failed to establish the second element, she failed to meet her 
burden.
688
 
C.   Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 
In another Northern District of Florida case, Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc.,
689
 the journalist’s privilege was before the court after a magistrate judge 
denied a motion to quash a subpoena.
690
 Greyhound sought information from Jeff 
Burlew, a professional reporter, who had observed Smoliak at a tailgate “party 
 ________________________  
 678. Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office, No. 3:99CV658J21HTS, 2002 WL 32128623 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 
4, 2002). 
 679. Id. at *1. 
 680. Id. 
 681. Id. 
 682. Id. 
 683. Id. 
 684. Green, 2002 WL 32128623 at *1. 
 685. Id. at *1–2. 
 686. Id. at *1. 
 687. Id. 
 688. Id. at *2. 
 689. Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 5:04CV245PSPMAK, 2005 WL 3434742 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 
2005). 
 690. Id. at *1. 
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before Florida State University’s first home game in 2002.”691 Smoliak sought 
“damages for injuries he suffered as a passenger in a bus accident on December 4, 
2000.”692 Smoliak “claim[ed] that the accident caused him severe pain that kept 
him in bed, [made him] unable to move some days, and forced him to drop out of 
pre-med classes.”693  
The issue before the court was “whether the reporter’s privilege, codified at 
section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes, protect[ed] Burlew from being a witness 
concerning his eyewitness observations of Plaintiff, Scott Smoliak, on matters 
relevant to [the] case” and, if so, “whether [Greyhound] made a sufficient showing 
to overcome the privilege.”694 In considering whether the privilege applied to 
eyewitness observations, the court and the magistrate “relied [on] the Florida 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Miami Herald [Publishing] Co. v. Morejon.”695  
“In Morejon, the [court] stated ‘that there is no privilege, qualified, limited, or 
otherwise, which protects journalists from testifying as to their eyewitness 
observations of a relevant event in a subsequent proceeding.’”696 However, the 
federal court interpreted Morejon to be limited to criminal matters, because 
Morejon was a criminal case and many of the cases cited therein were about 
journalists having to testify about criminal activity that the reporters observed.
697
 
The federal court also relied on the later Florida Supreme Court case of State v. 
Davis.
698
 The court surmised that because this was not a criminal case, the privilege 
applied.
699
 In addition, there was no indication that Burlew had observed Smoliak 
committing a crime.
700
  
After examining the other two factors, the court found that Greyhound had not 
demonstrated a compelling need that was sufficient to overcome the reporter’s 
privilege.
701
 “[T]he observations at issue represent[ed] just one day in [Smoliak’s] 
life,” and Smoliak had “admitted in his deposition that he attended games and 
could drink six or seven beers in one episode.”702 Also, Smoliak “did not deny 
making the statement” to Burlew nor did he “deny being at the pre-game party.”703 
Furthermore, the court found that Greyhound made no attempt to depose “Nick 
Crossman or Mark Spiser, who according to [Burlew’s] article were with [Smoliak] 
at the pre-game party.”704 Therefore, the court quashed the subpoena issued to 
Burlew.
705
  
 ________________________  
 691. Id. at *1–2 (“[T]he parties do not dispute that Jeff Burlew is a ‘professional journalist.’”). 
 692. Id. at *2. 
 693. Id. 
 694. Id. at *1. 
 695. Smoliak, 2005 WL 3434742 at *1. 
 696. Id. (citing Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1990)). 
 697. Id. at *2. 
 698. Id. 720 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1998). 
 699. Id.  
 700. Id. 
 701. Smoliak, 2005 WL 3434742 at *3. 
 702. Id. 
 703. Id. 
 704. Id. 
 705. Id. 
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D.   United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc. 
In the most recent case, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida, the Orlando Division, examined the journalist’s privilege in the case of 
the United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc.
706
 However, the federal court 
decided that the Florida statute did not apply because the case was “brought under 
the Fair Housing Act and jurisdiction [was] based on a federal question.”707 
Therefore, federal law governed the case.
708
  
XII.  REVIEW OF FLORIDA’S JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
The tension between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution continues to exist in Florida. The tension is inherent in the 
relationship of these two amendments. The press seeks to gather and publish 
information free from any governmental intrusion. The justice system seeks 
relevant evidence to ensure fair trials for defendants, plaintiffs, and victims.  
The reporter’s privilege in Florida was initially recognized in the Morgan case, 
decided in 1976, by the Florida Supreme Court.
709
 Its creation is based on the 
court’s analysis of the Branzburg decision.710 More specifically, the Florida 
Supreme Court adopted Justice Powell’s concurring opinion and found the 
existence of a qualified reporter’s privilege.711 While the Florida Supreme Court 
recognized a journalist’s privilege in both criminal and civil cases, the privilege 
was not expansive. Initially, the privilege protected information from only 
confidential sources.
712
 Neither eyewitness observations of a crime nor recordings 
of a crime were privileged.
713
  
The Florida Supreme Court eventually adopted a three-prong test in 1998.
714
 
The court attached another requirement, or prong, that weighed the test in favor of 
forcing disclosure of information during trial proceedings.
715
 The court ruled that 
when determining a compelling need for information, a trial court must factor into 
the test “the federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and due process 
so as to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”716 This additional burden, or 
fourth prong, is tantamount to the creation of a presumption that favors the 
limitation of the privilege in a criminal setting. The application of the court’s 
 ________________________  
 706. United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-891-Orl-35DAB, 2009 WL 1905046 
(M.D. Fla. July 1, 2009). 
 707. Id. at *2. 
 708. Id. 
 709. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976). 
 710. Id. at 953–54 (analyzing and interpreting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). 
 711. Id. at 954. 
 712. Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722, 723, 725 (Fla. 1986). 
 713. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). As one of the first cases to recognize a reporter’s privilege, the 
Court did not make any exceptions to the criminal setting it was confronted with. 
 714. State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998). 
 715. Id. 
 716. Id. 
53
: A Reporter's Privilege in Florida
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013
146 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 1 
 
balancing test has benefited Sixth Amendment interests at the expense of First 
Amendment interests.
717
  
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that confessions are “direct evidence of a 
crime” and not protected by any privilege.718 The court also ruled that the qualified 
reporter’s privilege applied to both confidential and non-confidential information, 
in both criminal and civil cases.
719
  
The Florida Legislature finally addressed the reporter’s privilege in favor of a 
qualified privilege. While not as protective as many common law privileges also 
recognized by the Florida Evidence Code, the reporter’s privilege had gained 
statutory strength. Its strength is limited to the three-prong test, as well as to its 
exceptions. “[T]he privilege does not apply to eyewitness observations or physical 
evidence, including recordings, of a crime.”720 While the legislature adopted a 
three-prong test, the added requirement, or fourth prong, under Davis is still being 
applied as a further limitation of the privilege.
721
 Subsequent to the passage of the 
journalist’s privilege by the legislature, only a few appellate courts have addressed 
the statute. To date, the Florida Supreme Court has not directly analyzed the new 
statute.  
XIII.  SURVEY OF REGISTERED FLORIDA VOTERS’ ATTITUDES  
A.   Methodology 
The following survey was designed to discover and analyze the attitudes and 
perceptions of Florida’s registered voters in order to see if those perceptions and 
attitudes are in sync with the law, which provides for a reporter’s privilege.722 The 
survey concerns the importance of the First Amendment’s right to a free press 
versus the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial.723  
The survey was conducted by phone.
724
 The respondents were from a list 
obtained by the surveyor on March 29, 2011, of randomly sampled registered 
voters throughout the State of Florida.
725
 Only phone numbers were used to create a 
random and anonymous response.
726
 The phone numbers were further randomized 
by using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel, so that they would not be called 
 ________________________  
 717. Id. By adding a fourth prong that favors the limitation of the privilege in a criminal setting, the court 
has shown a preference of the Sixth Amendment over the First Amendment. 
 718. Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998). 
 719. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222 (“[W]e answer . . . finding that the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida 
applies to factual situations involving both nonconfidential and confidential information.”); Morris Commc’n 
Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So. 2d 230, 231–32 (Fla. 1998) (“[W]e clarify that a qualified reporter’s privilege applies in 
both civil and criminal proceedings.”).  
 720. Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227. 
 721. See Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671 (while acknowledging the three-prong test in Davis, the majority agreed 
that the fourth prong should also be considered). 
 722. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 723. Id. 
 724. Id. 
 725. Id. 
 726. Id. 
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in any particular order.
727
 The RAND function generates a random decimal in cell 
B1 with the numbers in Column A.
728
 The formula is copied and pasted so that 
each phone number is associated with a different random decimal.
729
  
The sample started with 30,000 respondents who were dialed up to a maximum 
of six times in order to obtain 600 responses.
730
 When the respondents answered 
the phone, they heard the recorded questions and pushed the numbers that 
corresponded to the answer choices, and those numbers were recorded.
731
  
B.   Procedure 
The survey consisted of fifteen questions.
732
 The respondents could choose the 
answers yes, no, or not sure.
733
 The first three questions were asked to gauge if the 
respondents felt that a free press and the right to a fair trial were important, and to 
see which one was more important if there was a conflict between the two.
734
 The 
next seven questions focused on the rights of the reporter to protect their sources 
and to see in what instances the respondents would support that right.
735
 The last 
five questions focused on demographics, in order to see the makeup of the 
respondents, and if factors like gender, race, age, education, and political 
affiliations impacted the results.
736
  
C.   Results 
Of the 600 respondents, 53% were female and 47% were male.
737
 Forty-one 
percent were Democrats, 34% were Republicans, and 25% were 
Independents/Other.
738
 Sixty-eight percent of the respondents were White, 15% 
were Hispanic, 12% were African-American, and 6% were marked other.
739
 Thirty-
six percent of the respondents were age 46 to 65, 28% were older than 65, 24% 
were 30 to 45 years of age, and 12% were 18 to 29 years old.
740
 Forty-eight percent 
of the respondents had a two or four year degree, 25% had a high school education, 
24% had more than a four-year degree, and 4% marked none of the above.
741
  
When asked if they felt that a free press was important, 91% of all respondents 
answered yes, 4% said no, and 5% said that they were not sure.
742
 When asked if 
 ________________________  
 727. Id. 
 728. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 729. Id. 
 730. Id. 
 731. Id. 
 732. Id. 
 733. Id. 
 734. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 735. Id. 
 736. Id. 
 737. Id. 
 738. Id. 
 739. Id. 
 740. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.  
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. 
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they felt that a right to a fair trial was important, 96% of the respondents said yes, 
3% said no, and 1% said that they were not sure.
743
 However, when the respondents 
were asked which right was more important if a conflict existed between the right 
to a free press and the right to a fair trial, 68% of the respondents picked the right 
to a fair trial, 13% picked the right to a free press, and 19% said that they were not 
sure.
744
  
The most salient results were found in question number three. While 91% of 
respondents said that a free press was important and 96% said that the right to a fair 
trial was important, when asked to choose which was more important in the face of 
a conflict, 68% picked the right to a fair trial and 13% picked a right to a free-
press, and those that were not sure rose significantly.
745
 Perhaps this is why the 
battle to secure a reporter’s privilege under the law has been slow and arduous. In 
this instance, the law is in sync with public perception, in that, a right to a fair trial 
is paramount.  
When asked if a reporter should have the right to protect his or her confidential 
sources from disclosure, 63% said yes, 24% said no, and 12% said that they were 
not sure.
746
 When asked if they would support a law that allows reporters to protect 
their sources, 55% of the respondents said yes, 27% said no, and 18% were not 
sure.
747
 However, when the respondents were asked if a reporter should be required 
to reveal a source if the information is needed to ensure a fair trial, 67% of 
respondents said yes, 18% said no, and 15% were not sure.
748
 As in the first 
instance, the right to a fair trial trumps a reporter’s rights when a conflict between 
the two arises.  
The respondents were divided when they were asked if reporters should be 
incarcerated if they disobeyed a court order to disclose a confidential source or 
information.
749
 Only 44% of respondents said yes, 39% said no, and 16% were not 
sure.
750
 When asked if they would support a law that protects reporters from 
incarceration, 36% said yes, 40% said no, and 24% said that they were not sure.
751
  
The respondents were then asked if a reporter observes a crime being 
committed,  whether the reporter should be required to testify as to his or her 
observances.
752
 In response to this question, 84% said yes, 8% said no, and 7% 
were not sure.
753
 The numbers were a little lower when respondents were asked if a 
reporter hears a witness make statements concerning a crime, whether they think 
that reporter should be required to testify about what was heard.
754
 Seventy-three 
 ________________________  
 743. Id. 
 744. Id. 
 745. Id. (analysis came from comparing the results from questions one, two, and three). 
 746. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 747. Id. 
 748. Id. 
 749. Id. (analysis came from observing the results in question seven). 
 750. Id. 
 751. Id. 
 752. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 753. Id. 
 754. Id. 
56
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/4
Fall 2013 A Reporter's Privilege in Florida 149 
 
percent of respondents answered yes, 16% said no, and 10% were not sure.
755
 
These results are also consistent with the state of the law, which holds that a 
reporter must testify if he observes a crime being committed or overhears 
statements regarding a crime.
756
  
The data was then cross-tabulated to see what the results would show when 
they were tabulated for gender, party affiliation, race, age, and education.
757
 The 
statistics were very close when the respondents were analyzed based on gender. It 
appears that males and females answered in a similar way on the majority of the 
questions. However, it appears that females answered more often that they were not 
sure on questions seven through ten. For example, when asked if there should be a 
law to protect reporter’s sources, the results were that 21% of females were not 
sure versus 15% males.
758
 When asked whether reporters should go to jail if they 
disobey a court order, 22% of females were not sure versus 10% males.
759
 And 
when asked whether they would support a law protecting reporters for refusing to 
disclose a source, 33% of females were not sure versus 14% males.
760
 Females also 
tended to be more supportive of a reporter’s rights in questions four through seven.  
When the results were analyzed for party affiliation, the results were also 
surprisingly consistent among the respondents. Notably, a significant difference 
was seen where democrats were more supportive of a reporter’s rights than their 
counterparts.
761
 This is especially noticeable in questions four through eight.
762
  
Notable in the race categories was that Hispanics and African Americans were 
at 75% and 79% respectively concerning question three, when their counterparts 
were at 66% and 56% in finding a fair trial more important than a free press.
763
 
Another deviation was from the subgroup called “Other,” when asked if a reporter 
should have to reveal his or her source to ensure a fair trial, that group answered 
yes at 82% versus other groups whose answers ranged from 65% through 70%.
764
 
The “Other” subgroup was also 15% higher on questions nine and ten.765 
When analyzed according to age, the eighteen through twenty-nine year olds 
deviated from their counterparts concerning questions one, two, three, nine, and 
ten.
766
  
The only correlation for education were on questions three, six, seven, and 
eight, where it appears that high school and none-of-the-above subgroups voted 
similarly on those questions.
767
  
 ________________________  
 755. Id. 
 756. Id. 
 757. Id. 
 758. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 759. Id. 
 760. Id. 
 761. Id. 
 762. Id. 
 763. Id. 
 764. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 765. Id. 
 766. Id. 
 767. Id. 
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D.   Further Analysis of Survey Results 
Surprisingly, the overall survey results were very consistent with the law as it 
now stands. While the respondents found that the right to a free press and the right 
to a fair trial were equally important, when there was a conflict between the two, 
the Sixth Amendment prevailed.
768
 Also, the answers to questions nine and ten, 
whether a reporter should have to testify if he observes a crime or overhears 
evidence of a crime, were also very consistent with the law as it now stands.
769
 
Notably, the respondents were split on questions four through eight and were more 
ambiguous than in their answers to one, two, three, nine, and ten.
770
 Perhaps that is 
why the courts created a balancing test in those situations. Maybe the respondents 
were looking for the middle ground like the courts.  
XIV.  CONCLUSION 
In looking at the reporter’s privilege in Florida, this paper has raised the 
question as to whether the conflict between the First Amendment and the Sixth 
Amendment has been reconciled. The Florida Supreme Court, through case 
decisions, has reconciled the constitutional conflict.
771
 The Florida Legislature, 
through the passage of section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes, has also reconciled 
the debate between the two amendments.
772
 Both the Florida Supreme Court and 
the Florida Legislature have settled the constitutional dispute by adopting a 
balancing test to be applied when both amendments are in play within the justice 
system.
773
 Interestingly, the balancing test pronounced by the Florida Supreme 
Court is weighted in favor of the Sixth Amendment’s need for evidence over the 
interest of a free press in the First Amendment.
774
 The court’s test is less protective 
of the journalist’s privilege than the test set out by the legislature.775  
While the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature have settled the 
conflict, the question remains whether the application of a balancing test 
appropriately resolves the dispute. The balancing test’s goal is not to reach 
equilibrium with amendments on opposite sides of the scale. The test is clearly 
from the justice system’s perspective. The perspective is focused on the 
admissibility of evidence. Unlike absolute common law privileges recognized in 
the Florida Evidence Code, the qualified journalist’s privilege may be overcome 
 ________________________  
 768. Id. 
 769. Id. 
 770. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 771. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (the balancing test takes consideration of both 
freedom of press and right to a fair trial). 
 772. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998) (by including a privilege limitation in criminal cases, the Florida 
Legislature has used the balancing test). 
 773. Id.; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. 
 774. Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954 (the balancing test takes consideration of criminal cases and makes 
exceptions to the privilege, thus making it favor the Sixth Amendment). 
 775. See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. 
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without great difficulty because of the emphasis placed on the Sixth Amendment 
by both the courts and the legislature.
776
  
The balancing test does not give equal value to both amendments. It is a test 
that results in the impingement of one amendment in favor of another. The 
impingement is upon the First Amendment in favor of rights enumerated in the 
Sixth Amendment. No court would consider compromising the Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial. Courts have not been as deferential to or mindful of 
compromising free-press rights.
777
 
Likewise, the survey showed that Florida voters also value the right to a fair 
trial over the right to a free press.
778
 The survey showed that respondents highly 
and equally valued the right to a free press and the right to a fair trial.
779
 However, 
when a conflict arose between the two, the right to a fair trial was chosen 68% of 
the time.
780
 Perhaps the law is based on common sense in this instance. Is the best 
law not based on principles that the common person can understand, value, and 
ultimately choose to follow?  
Or is a test that would have as its goal a state of equilibrium, one that would 
give equal value to both amendments preferable? Giving equal value to both 
amendments would not result in the admissibility into evidence of information 
gathered and published by reporters. If the First Amendment were viewed as 
having equal value to the Sixth Amendment, a court or legislature would not 
impinge upon it.
781
  
Many in the media support this view, and it has some support from those in the 
judiciary.
782
 Information from the press under this analysis would be admitted into 
court only at the pleasure of the particular news agency or individual journalist. In 
the past, journalists have voluntarily testified to confessions made by criminal 
defendants in murder cases.
783
 If the decision to provide testimony were left to 
those in the press, then it is likely that voluntary evidence would be provided in 
particular cases. 
Is one amendment more important than another? Did our founders intend to 
apply equal value to the First and Sixth Amendments? Would they applaud or 
decry the balancing test being utilized? If one were a strict constructionist, there 
would be the argument that all the amendments should have equal value. The 
founders did not intend that one amendment be given greater weight than 
 ________________________  
 776. See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954; EHRHARDT, supra note 373. 
 777. See generally CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the privilege does not 
apply to video recording that were taken during criminal events); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 
577 (Fla. 1990) (holding that no privilege existed when a reporter witnessed an event during a criminal situation 
during the scope of a news investigation). 
 778. Public Policy Polling, supra note 3. 
 779. Id. 
 780. Id. 
 781. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 782. See Latara Appleby, Senate Judiciary Committee Passes a Reporter’s Shield Bill, REPORTERS 
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news/senate-judiciary-committee-passes-reporters-shield-bill. (The Senate Judiciary Committee passed a 
federal shield bill for the Senate’s approval that will give reporters a qualified privilege.). 
 783. State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998). 
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another.
784
 Ideally, there should be no interference upon the First Amendment in 
favor of another amendment. Academically, one would not favor the Sixth 
Amendment above another amendment either.  
If the ideal would be to give equal value to the First Amendment, why have 
courts and legislatures adopted and applied a balancing test? Perhaps the answer is 
that it is a pragmatic compromise between competing interests within the First and 
Sixth Amendments. It should be noted that prior to the passage of shield laws, 
many judges did not recognize any journalist’s privilege at all, other than from a 
bad faith investigation.
785
 Yet, not recognizing any privilege places very little value 
on the First Amendment; considering a journalist to be no different than any other 
citizen fails to give any value or deference to free-press rights. While a balancing 
test gives greater respect and deference to the First Amendment, it still results in an 
impingement upon it. The consequence of balancing, however, is the compromise 
of one amendment over another. It sacrifices one in favor of another.  
The failure to give equal value to the amendments is based upon individuals, 
ultimately judges, who believe that the Sixth Amendment has greater value than 
the First Amendment.
786
 It is an application of the amendments that seeks as its 
priority an admirable goal—a fair trial.787 It is a pragmatic good faith application 
made by those who operate within the Sixth Amendment as part of the trial 
process.
788
 This creates an understandable, yet natural bias in favor of giving 
greater value to the right to a fair trial as compared with a free press. Imagine if the 
decision of admitting a journalist’s information were to be made by the media as 
opposed to the courts. The perspective would be one that gave great value and 
deference to free-press rights in favor of protecting a reporter’s information from 
disclosure.  
As an academic exercise, it is easy to discuss the optimum application of the 
Bill of Rights. The ideal application of equal value to the amendments will often 
bring about a practical, but harsh result. In the justice system, a defendant will be 
denied exculpatory evidence and the prosecution will be denied material evidence 
that impacts the ability to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
789
 In civil 
cases, similar results will occur.
790
 If the optimum ideal is not acceptable from a 
policy standpoint, the balancing test is a pragmatic approach to resolving conflict 
between the First and Sixth Amendments.  
On the other hand, other privileges in the evidence code sacrifice admissible 
evidence in favor of a societal purpose.
791
 The consequence of nondisclosure from 
 ________________________  
 784. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI. (Article VI of the Constitution states that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. Because it does not state that one article and/or amendment can be more supreme than 
another, it follows that all articles and/or amendments are held equal to one another.). 
 785. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 786. See Sandra F. Chance & Susan D. Ross, Gag Orders: Shields or Swords in the Constitutional Conflict 
Between Fair Trial and Free Press, 1 COMM. L. & POL’Y 271–97 (1996). 
 787. Id. 
 788. Id. 
 789. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984). 
 790. Id. at 412 n.129. 
 791. See EHRHARDT, supra note 373. 
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those privileges is harsh from a justice system perspective. If a confession were 
given within the context of the lawyer-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege, 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, or the clergy-penitent privilege, disclosure of 
the statement would not take place.
792
 The absolute nature of those privileges, 
subject to their exceptions, would protect the confidentiality of the information.
793
 
Why then is the journalist’s privilege less important than other privileges? Why are 
traditional common law privileges in the evidence code more important than the 
reporter’s privilege? The journalist’s privilege is the weakest privilege in the 
Florida Evidence Code.
794
 As a statutory privilege, the journalist’s privilege is the 
weakest privilege in terms of precluding disclosure of protected information.
795
 Its 
strength is based on the value that the people of Florida have accorded the press as 
compared with other privileged relationships.
796
 
It is interesting to see the deference given to an absolute privilege. The courts 
are reluctant to invade a common law privilege, even when faced with Sixth 
Amendment interests.
797
 Yet, the courts have little hesitancy invading the 
journalist’s privilege based on the First Amendment of the Constitution in favor of 
the Sixth Amendment.
798
 Evidently, there is support for the principle that the Sixth 
Amendment cannot trump a common law privilege, but one amendment, the Sixth 
Amendment, may easily trump another amendment, the First Amendment.
799
 
Theoretically, it should be easier for a constitutional right, such as the Sixth 
Amendment, to trump a common law privilege rather than a constitutional 
amendment to trump another constitutional amendment.
800
  
The application of a balancing test should take place with equal value being 
afforded to both amendments. The test should not be weighted at the outset in favor 
of impinging upon the First Amendment. Also, the balancing test should apply to 
all information that is requested from a journalist. If a defendant gives multiple 
confessions, a balancing test may preclude a journalist from testifying about that 
same confession. Yet under Florida case law, a confession has been interpreted as 
being direct evidence and, therefore, an exception to the privilege.
801
  
 ________________________  
 792. See The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS (2002), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/guides/reporters-
privilege/introduction#sthash.j7i5czfU.dpuf [hereinafter, REPORTER’S COMMITTEE]. 
 793. Id. 
 794. EHRHARDT, supra note 373. 
 795. Id. (comparing to the common law privileges found in Florida’s Evidence Code). 
 796. See generally Public Policy Polling, supra note 3 (showing that the majority of those questioned 
believe a fair trial is more important than the freedom of press when they conflict each other). 
 797. See generally State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing that a 
defendant could not obtain privileged communication between the victim and her psychotherapist even if the 
defendant can show a “reasonable probability” that the communication is necessary to his defense). 
 798. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (discussing the balancing test shows that when 
confronted with the fair trial of a defendant, the privilege may not apply). 
 799. See REPORTER’S COMMITTEE, supra note 792. 
 800. See generally EHRHARDT, supra note 373 at 284–405; U.S. CONST. art. VI. (Article VI of the 
Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Because a common law privilege cannot be 
held higher than the Constitution, it follows that a constitutional right is supreme to a common law privilege.).   
 801. Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998). 
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Judges should be educated on the importance of free-press rights. It is critical 
to note that the result of any balancing test depends on who is doing the 
balancing.
802
 Many judges have an adversarial perspective when considering First 
Amendment issues.
803
 Even United States Supreme Court Justices are distrustful 
and critical of the media.
804
 Many judges view the media as being very powerful, 
critical, and unethical.
805
 It is an important role of a free press to investigate the 
government and to freely publish that information to the public. Many people in the 
government, including judges, do not understand nor appreciate the media’s 
function, especially when the news story is about that individual.
806
 This creates an 
antagonistic relationship. It is understandable then that the underlying conflict 
between a judge and the media would give rise to a conflict between the First and 
Sixth Amendment.  
In the final analysis, the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature 
have reconciled the competing interests presented by the First and Sixth 
Amendments.
807
 The balancing test is a pragmatic approach to reconciling conflicts 
between the amendments. The balancing test, however, results in a compromise 
often at the expense of impinging upon free-press rights in favor of the right to a 
fair trial.
808
 The test favors forced disclosure of information from the media. The 
test is applied by judges who may, unknowingly and sometimes knowingly, have a 
bias in favor of Sixth Amendment rights and against free press rights. With a better 
understanding and education on the function of the press, judges will be better able 
to apply an objective, unbiased balancing test. Until equal value is placed on the 
First and Sixth Amendments, the tension between the two amendments and 
between the media and the courts will continue in Florida.  
 
 ________________________  
 802. Chance & Ross, supra note 786. 
 803. Id. 
 804. See generally S.L. ALEXANDER, COVERING THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALIST 68 
(University Press of America 1999).  (“[J]udges are particularly sensitive to public opinion of their abilities, and 
many judges are wary of courtroom cameras which may broadcast every detail of their conduct in a trial for all to 
evaluate.”); KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS (2007). This book was written about Justice Clarence Thomas. He was quoted as describing the media as 
“malicious.” He also stated the following to a reporter, “You’ve got some scoundrels in your business. Why do 
you have so many scoundrels?” Justice Thomas’s contempt for the media is shared by other judges in the country, 
including Justice Scalia. 
 805. ALEXANDER, supra note 804. 
 806. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 804. 
 807. See generally FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (After 
the Supreme Court of Florida held that there should be a proper balance between the First and Sixth Amendments, 
legislature enacted section 90.5015(2) of the Florida Statutes which states that a privilege applies to a reporter’s 
eyewitness observations obtained during the scope of employment but does not apply to physical evidence, 
eyewitness observations, or recordings of a crime.).  
 808. See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. The balancing test found in both sources show that when 
confronted with the fair trial of a defendant, the privilege may not apply to all situations. 
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